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CONTAMINATED CONFESSIONS REVISITED
Brandon L. Garrett*
INTRODUCTION
A second wave of false confessions is cresting. In the first twenty-one years of postconviction DNA testing, 250 innocent people were
exonerated, forty of whom had falsely confessed.' Those false confes-
sions have attracted sustained public attention from courts, law enforce-
ment, policymakers, and the media; many did not previously believe that
a person could confess falsely until DNA testing became available to
sometimes prove confessions false quite conclusively. 2 In just the last
* Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. Many thanks to Greg DeClue,
Steven Drizin, Vahid Gholampour, Richard Leo, Peter Neufeld, Eve Brensike Primus, Josh
Tepfer, and Jim Trainum for their encouragement and invaluable comments on earlier drafts.
I particularly thank lawyers and court clerks for assisting in locating materials from these
exoneration cases, and Kent Olson from the UVA law library and Vanessa Meterko from the
Innocence Project for their assistance. I thank Jennifer Evans, Kate Naseef, Angela Porter,
Matthew Skanchy, and Kaitlyn Whiteside for their superlative research assistance.
1 The first 250 DNA exonerations occurred from 1989 through early 2010 (the case of
Freddie Peacock was the 250th), a time period just over twenty years. I first studied those
cases in an Article and updated those data in my book Convicting the Innocent. Brandon L.
Garrett, Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong 5-21 (2011)
[hereinafter Garrett, Convicting the Innocent]; Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False
Confessions, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1051, 1052 (2010) [hereinafter Garrett, The Substance of
False Confessions].
2 The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, has cited to examples of false confessions uncov-
ered by DNA testing in capital cases. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 n.25 (2002)
("[I]n recent years a disturbing number of inmates on death row have been exonerated....
includ[ing] at least one mentally retarded person [Earl Washington, Jr.] who unwittingly
confessed to a crime that he did not commit."). For examples of lower courts citing research
documenting false confessions, see, for example, United States v. Preston, 706 F.3d 1106,
1127 (9th Cir. 2013); Harris v. Thompson, 698 F.3d 609, 631 (7th Cir. 2012); State v. Lock-
hart, 4 A.3d 1176, 1206-07 (Conn. 2010); Commonwealth v. Wright, 14 A.3d 798, 811 n.11
(Pa. 2011). John Grisham's nonfiction book told the story of another such false confession
case, and the Central Park Five case has been the subject of an award-winning documentary
by Ken Bums. John Grisham, The Innocent Man: Murder and Injustice in a Small Town
119-29 (2006); The Central Park Five (IFC Films 2012). Regarding a shift in law enforce-
ment attitudes, see Saul M. Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-
Report Survey of Police Practices and Beliefs, 31 Law & Hum. Behav. 381, 384-85, 396
(2007).
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five years, however, over half as many again have come to light-
twenty-six more false confessions-among DNA exonerations 3 Why
are so many of the recent exonerations cases with false confessions, of-
ten despite the availability of DNA testing at the time of trial? That is a
puzzle that initially motivated this Essay.
The outsized weight placed on confession evidence may explain why
recent DNA exonerations are so dominated by false confessions. Judges,
defense lawyers, prosecutors, and jurors may have a very hard time be-
lieving that a person could confess falsely. As it turns out, contaminated
false confessions may appear particularly credible and worthy of belief.
Like the first wave of false confessions that came to light through DNA
testing, the more recently exposed false confessions were seemingly de-
tailed-containing information that police had said only the true culprits
could have known. Now we know that these innocent people could not
have volunteered such "inside information" about the crime scenes, and
in fact, their false confessions were contaminated.
While the exonerations occurred from 2009-2014, some of the con-
victions occurred decades earlier, but were so hard fought that despite
the postconviction DNA test results, prosecutors prolonged the litigation
for years before ultimately acceding to exonerations. Other convictions
were more recent and are troubling for a different reason: Nearly half of
these false confession cases involved convictions despite DNA tests that
excluded the defendants at the time of conviction. Nineteen of the entire
group of sixty-six exonerees had DNA tests exclude them at the time
they were convicted. Sixteen of the new cases involved groups of false
confessions by individuals inculpating each other, in which false confes-
sions had cascading effects encouraging police to aggressively pursue
more false leads.
This second wave of false confessions should cause even greater
alarm than the first. It suggests what future wrongful convictions may
look like-even in cases where DNA tests can be performed and with
more hard-fought cases involving poorly documented and contaminated
confession evidence. Despite decades of DNA exonerations that have
proven confessions false and even potentially fabricated, some in our
3 An updated table with information concerning the twenty-six additional false confession
cases and the previous forty false confessions examined, is available in the Appendix and
also in an expanded version at this resource website: Brandon L. Garrett, False Confessions:
Transcripts and Testimony, U. Virginia Sch. L., http://www.law.virginia.edu/htinllibrarysite/
garrettfalseconfess.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
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criminal justice system remain uninformed of those dangers-and highly
resistant to revisiting confessions. Exonerations in cases involving con-
fessions, but without the benefit of DNA testing, may face a far more
uphill battle.4 In the death penalty cases of Henry Lee McCollum and
Leon Brown, the half-brothers challenged their 1984 convictions for
over thirty years on appeal, obtaining retrials but new convictions and
seeking habeas corpus review with no success, until it was discovered in
2010 that police still had the crime scene evidence; and DNA tests of
that evidence in 2014 cleared them and inculpated another man.' Even in
the comparatively recent cases, involving DNA testing at the time of tri-
al or conviction, as well as older cases relitigated with the benefit of
more recent DNA tests, these exonerations were slow in coming. De-
spite the presence of scientific evidence of a highly probative character,
judges denied relief pretrial and postconviction, and jurors readily con-
victed. Indeed, in one 1997 death penalty case, law enforcement refused
to conduct DNA tests, having secured a false confession.6 These false
confessions highlight the importance of proposals to improve interroga-
tion techniques, minimize coercion, and require special procedures for
interrogations of juveniles and the mentally disabled. These false con-
fessions also highlight the importance of videotaping entire interroga-
tions to document carefully who said what in order to prevent confession
contamination. However, there is little evidence that interrogations are
themselves better regulated in many jurisdictions, despite the increasing-
ly well-known dangers of false confessions and the growing adoption of
recording in more jurisdictions.
Revisiting judicial review of confession evidence raises still addition-
al challenges. Many have argued that the current constitutional voluntar-
4 The National Registry of Exonerations includes over 178 exonerations that involved confes-
sions, the majority of which were non-DNA exonerations. % Exonerations by Contributing Fac-
tor, Nat'l Registry of Exonerations, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/
ExonerationsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); see also Samuel R.
Gross & Michael Shaffer, Nat'l Registry of Exonerations, Exonerations in the United States,
1989-2012, at 2-4 (June 2012), available at www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/
exonerations us 1989 2012 full report.pdf (listing exonerations),
Joseph Neff, Judge Overturns Convictions of Robeson Men in Child's 1983 Rape, Mur-
der, News Observer (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.newsobserver.com/2014/09/02/4115955/
robeson-men-innocent-of-childs.html.
6 This is the Damon Thibodeaux case discussed infra note 55.
Laura H. Nirider, Joshua A. Tepfer & Steven A. Drizin, Combating Contamination in
Confession Cases, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 837, 845-53 (2012) (reviewing Convicting the Inno-
cent and focusing on the problem of confession contamination).
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iness test under the Fifth Amendment and Due Process Clause does not
successfully regulate interrogations, nor does Miranda meaningfully af-
fect interrogation practices in most cases or substantially safeguard reli-
ability.' A framework for better regulating confessions in the courtroom
could instead begin with an evidence law analysis, as Richard Leo, Peter
Neufeld, Steven Drizin, Andrew Taslitz, and others have proposed, with
a reliability hearing under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 or its state law
equivalent.9 No jurisdiction has yet adopted that proposal, but neverthe-
less, I suggest ways to broaden it. Due process review of confession evi-
dence, including examining Brady v. Maryland'0 and Napue v. Illinois'1
issues surrounding undocumented confession statements, could supple-
ment existing Fifth Amendment-geared review of confessions. A Napue
analysis would ask whether there is evidence that a confession was fab-
ricated due to contamination by law enforcement disclosure of crime
scene facts.1 2 Neither pretrial reliability, nor due process, nor Fifth
Amendment review is sufficient.
A scientific framework should inform the use of interrogation proce-
dures by police departments, as well as the review of confession evi-
dence pretrial, through a trial, on appeal, and postconviction. Police de-
partments are increasingly considering best practices to electronically
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Sharon L. Davies, The Reality of False Con-
fessions-Lessons of the Central Park Jogger Case, 30 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 209,
223-41 (2006); Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, supra note 1, at 1092-97;
Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards
in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 479, 490-99 (2006); Eugene R. Milhizer,
Confessions After Connelly: An Evidentiary Solution for Excluding Unreliable Confessions,
81 Temp. L. Rev. 1, 20-28 (2008); Eve Brensike Primus, The Future of Confession Law:
Toward Rules for the Voluntariness Test, 115 Mich. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript
at 1-2) (on file with author); Boaz Sangero, Miranda Is Not Enough: A New Justification for
Demanding "Strong Corroboration" to a Confession, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 2791, 2802 (2007);
Andrew E. Taslitz, High Expectations and Some Wounded Hopes: The Policy and Politics of
a Uniform Statute on Videotaping Custodial Interrogations, 7 Nw. J.L. & Soc. Pol'y 400,
420-23 (2012); Sandra Guerra Thompson, Judicial Gatekeeping of Police-Generated Wit-
ness Testimony, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 329, 365-68 (2012).
9 Richard A. Leo, Police Interrogation and American Justice 285-91 (2008); Richard A.
Leo et al., Promoting Accuracy in the Use of Confession Evidence: An Argument for Pretrial
Reliability Assessments to Prevent Wrongful Convictions, 85 Temp. L. Rev. 759, 792-810
(2013). Regarding the intersections between constitutional law and the law of evidence, see
Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Law and the Law of Evidence, 100 Cornell L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2015).
10 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
" 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
12 See id. at 269-72.
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record and conduct interrogations. However, following an interrogation,
judges are understandably highly reluctant to completely exclude con-
fession evidence, even in the face of other exculpatory evidence such as
DNA test results, in part because the confession may be the central evi-
dence of guilt in a very serious criminal case. Extending judicial review
proposals, I suggest that a reliability inquiry, accompanying due process
and Fifth Amendment review, should frame factors informed by scien-
tific research that could also be set out in jury instructions.13 Courts
would examine whether to frame relevant scientific framework evidence
using such jury instructions or in the preferable alternative, using expert
testimony to explain aspects of the research that informs an understand-
ing of confession evidence. Such instructions or expert testimony,
grounded in evidentiary reliability concerns, would inform a jury regard-
less of whether it was a custodial interrogation regulated by the Consti-
tution or a noncustodial confession or inculpatory statement elicited by a
nonstate actor. Criminal investigations and trials should be informed by
the research on how to identify and prevent false confessions.1 4 Appel-
late and postconviction review should be informed by this research, par-
ticularly when reviewing claims that information was withheld or not
documented concerning interrogations or that trial lawyers were ineffec-
tive for failing to adequately challenge confession evidence. While DNA
testing increasingly clears suspects before trial, and as a result, will in-
creasingly not produce postconviction exonerations, the problems of
false confessions and confession contamination are here to stay.
I. THE TWENTY-SIx FALSE CONFESSIONS
A. Characteristics of the Twenty-Six Cases
Of these twenty-six new false confessions among the DNA exonerees,
ten were juveniles, at least two more had an intellectual disability, and
13 This proposal follows the influential model for "social framework evidence" developed
by Laurens Walker and John Monahan. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frame-
works: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 Va. L. Rev. 559, 559-70 (1987) ("[G]eneral
research results are used to construct a frame of reference or background context for decid-
in factual issues crucial to the resolution of a specific case.").
A recent National Academy of Sciences report on the different subject of eyewitness
identification evidence takes a similar approach in recommending that courts adopt a scien-
tifically informed framework towards the evidence. See Nat'l Research Council, Identifying
the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification 1-4 (2014).
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one more was mentally ill." Over one-third of all sixty-six false confes-
sions involved juveniles, and similarly, one-third involved individuals
who were mentally ill or had an intellectual disability.' 6 Apparently, on-
ly one among the sixty-six exonerees had an interrogation recorded in its
entirely (and that individual, Johnny Williams, was unable to say any-
thing about the crime beyond "I guess I did it"'7). Of the most recent
twenty-six false confessions, six had videotaped statements made of
their ultimate confession statements, two had audio recordings of parts
of the interrogation, one had a complete audio recording, and others had
written statements prepared by police. These false confession cases have
been concentrated in cases involving a murder. Three of the recent twen-
ty-six cases involved a rape, and the twenty-three others involved a
murder, seventeen of which involved both a rape and a murder. Three
had been sentenced to death.'
1 The ten juveniles are: Leon Brown, Anthony Caravella, Harold Richardson, Michael
Saunders, Shainne Sharp, Terrill Swift, Robert Taylor, Shariff Wilson, Robert Lee Veal, and
Anthony Yarbough. See infra Appendix. Of those ten, Leon Brown and Anthony Caravella
also had an intellectual disability. Of the remaining sixteen, two others who had an intellec-
tual disability were Bobby Ray Dixon and Henry McCollum, and Curtis Jasper Moore was
mentally ill. See id.
16 In the group of sixty-six false confessions, twenty-three were juveniles, and at least
twenty-two had an intellectual disability or were mentally ill. See infra Appendix. This
tracks the pattern among the first forty such false confessions, in which fourteen had an intel-
lectual disability, three were mentally ill, and thirteen were juveniles. Garrett, Convicting the
Innocent, supra note 1, at 21. The term "intellectual disability" has replaced the term "mental
retardation" in federal regulation and in usage by the American Psychiatric Association. See
Change in Terminology: "Mental Retardation" to "Intellectual Disability," 78 Fed. Reg.
5755, 5756 (proposed Jan. 28, 2013); Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, DSM-5 Intellectual Disability
Fact Sheet 1 (2013), available at http://psychiatry.org/FILE%201ibrary/PRACTICE/
DSM/DSM-5/DSM-5-intellectual-disability-fact-sheet.pdf. Still others among these ex-
onerees, while not diagnosed with such a disability at the time of trial, may have been quite
suggestible or may have not been diagnosed because the defense did not retain experts. For
example, in 2001, an expert conducting a postconviction examination found that Damon
Thibodeaux, while having an IQ of seventy-nine and not considered mentally retarded using
the terminology then in use, was "passive, avoidant, obedient and depressed." Petitioner's
Motion for a New Trial at 67-69, State ex rel. Thibodeaux v. Cain, No. 96-4522 (Dist. Ct.
Jefferson Parish, La. Nov. 27, 2012) (on file with author).
1 Transcript of Trial at 330, People v. Williams, No. 134543 (Sup. Ct. Alameda Cnty.,
Cal. Nov. 17, 1999) [hereinafter Williams Trial Transcript]. All exoneree trial transcripts are
on file with the author.
1 Leon Brown, Henry McCollum, and Damon Thibodeaux had been sentenced to death. A
total of ten of the twenty DNA exonerees to date that were sentenced to death had falsely
confessed. Among the first forty false confessions studied, twenty-five cases involved a rape
and a murder, three involved a murder, and twelve were rape cases. Garrett, Convicting the
Innocent, supra note 1, at 21. In the entire group of sixty-six exonerees who falsely con-
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Sixteen of the twenty-six false confessions involved group confession
cases in which multiple people falsely confessed, implicating themselves
and sometimes also additional people, including some who did not con-
fess. 9 Confessions can have a multiplying effect, particularly in cases in
which police do not have a firm theory regarding how many culprits
were involved. This may particularly occur in murder cases in which
there were no eyewitnesses to the crime, making confessions potentially
crucial evidence, and in which the forensics do not make clear how
many people were involved in the murder.
Two sets of group false confession cases that occurred in Chicago
stand out.20 Four of these exonerees, Terrill Swift, Harold Richardson,
Michael Saunders, and Vincent Thames, had all been convicted of a
murder as teenagers in South Side Chicago based on confessions in a
case called the Englewood Four.2 1 In a second Illinois case called the
Dixmoor Five, Jonathan Barr, James Harden, Shainne Sharp, Robert
Taylor, and Robert Veal were convicted of a rape and murder, and three
of the youths, Sharp, Taylor, and Veal, had confessed to authorities.22
Six of those defendants were juveniles at the time of their arrest and in-
terrogations. And nine of the twenty-six recent false confessions were in
Illinois cases (the cases of James Edwards and Juan Rivera also involved
Illinois false confessions, both in Lake County, Illinois). Additional cas-
es involving group false confessions are those of Philip Bivens, Bobby
Ray Dixon, and Larry Ruffin who together falsely confessed to a murder
in Mississippi; Sharrif Wilson and Anthony Yarbough who both falsely
fessed, forty-two involved a rape and a murder, nine involved a murder, and fifteen involved
a rape. See infra Appendix.
See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. Among the first forty DNA exonerees,
there were group confessions among the Central Park Five, the Beatrice Six, the Ford
Heights Four, and other cases. Seventeen of those forty exonerees not only inculpated them-
selves but also falsely inculpated others. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, supra
note 1, at 1065 (stating that the two additional cases, William Kelly and Freddie Peacock, in
which exonerations had not occurred when that study was published, did not involve the in-
culpation of others).
2 As a result of this series of false confessions, some involving allegations of police bru-
tality, many involving youths, some have nicknamed Chicago the "false confession[s] capi-
tal." 60 Minutes: Chicago: The False Confession Capital (CBS television broadcast Dec. 9,
2012), available at http:/ www.cbsnews.com/videos/chicago-the-false-confession-capitall.
21 Steve Mills, U.S. Looking at Englewood 4 Case, Chi. Tribune, Dec. 9, 2012, § 1, at 13.
22 Press Release, Innocence Project, Three Men from Cook County, Illinois, Exonerated of
1991 Rape and Murder, Exonerations of Two Others to Follow (Nov. 3, 2011), available at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/ThreeMenfromCook CountyIllinoisExonera
ted of 1991_Rapeand MurderExonerations of TwoOthers to Follow.php.
2015] 401
402 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 101:395
confessed to murders in Brooklyn, New York; and the Harry McCollum
and Leon Brown cases discussed previously, in which the brothers were
sentenced to death in North Carolina based on their confessions.23
The twenty-six cases involved lengthy interrogations that took place
for more than three hours,2 4 with one exception: the case of William
Avery, who was interrogated for eighty minutes and who outright re-
fused to sign the confession statement prepared by the detectives. 25 At
the other end of the spectrum, James Edwards was interrogated for about
twenty-seven hours over multiple interrogation sessions. Frank Sterling
was interrogated for twelve hours before giving a videotaped statement,
including with the use of a "relaxation technique" that his lawyer
claimed had partially hypnotized him, and during which Sterling sup-
posedly first volunteered some of the key details concerning the crime.26
These twenty-six exonerees all waived their Miranda rights when
they were questioned by the police, just as the first forty exonerees who
had falsely confessed had done.27 Many waived their rights on video or
in signed statements.28 Judges then affirmed the voluntariness of all of
these confessions.29 In the Englewood Four cases, the judge initially
23 Additionally, Kenneth Kagonyera falsely confessed in a case also involving guilty pleas
of Robert Wilcoxson, who was also exonerated, and three other men whose cases are pend-
ing before the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission. See Kenneth Kagonyera, In-
nocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Kenneth_Kagonyera.php (last
visited Oct. 19, 2014).
24 See, e.g., Williams Trial Transcript, supra note 17, at 93.
25 Among the first forty exonerees who falsely confessed, only four of forty cases involved
interrogations that lasted less than three hours. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent, supra note
1, at 38. Thus, only eight percent or five of the sixty exonerees who falsely confessed were
interrogated for less than three hours. I chose three hours as a marker of length because the
Inbau and Reid treatise has recommended that interrogations not typically last more than
three hours (now "three or four" hours). Fred E. Inbau et al., Criminal Interrogation and
Confessions 423 (4th ed. 2001). The Fifth Edition instead states that "for the ordinary sus-
pect" a "properly conducted interrogation that lasts 3 or 4 hours" would not constitute "du-
ress." Fred E. Inbau et al., Criminal Interrogation and Confessions 347 (5th ed. 2013). I note
also that exoneree Johnny Williams was interrogated actively for two hours but remained in
an interrogation room for five hours. Williams Trial Transcript, supra note 17, at 93, 349.
26 Brandon L. Garrett, Who Confesses to a Crime They Didn't Commit?, Slate (Apr. 13, 2011,
3:53 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news and_politics/jurisprudence/features/201 1/
getting_it wrongconvicting the innocent/who confessesto_a crime theydidnt_commit.html.
27 Garrett, Convicting the Innocent, supra note 1, at 37.
28 Id.
29 In the first forty such false confessions by DNA exonerees, of the twenty-nine who had
a trial and whose available records indicated whether an admissibility challenge was
brought, twenty-eight, or ninety-seven percent, made such a challenge, and all were unsuc-
cessful. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent, supra note 1, at 36.
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ruled that Michael Saunders's confession was involuntary. The agitated
prosecutor informed the judge that if the confession were thrown out, he
would have to drop all of the charges. The judge granted a one-week
continuance for the State to put on additional witnesses, and after a se-
cond suppression hearing, the judge ruled that the confession was volun-
tary. In Robert Taylor's case, the judge found the testimony of the pros-
ecutor who wrote down the confession statement truthful and the
confession statements admissible, explaining:
And, yes, there are occasions when the police officers overstep their
bounds, and the case law addresses those, and there have been cases,
and I am very well aware of those cases. I am not naive, and I know
that that sometimes happens, and that they exceed their authority. This
is not one of these cases.30
Seven of the twenty-six exonerees pleaded guilty (and one more,
Sharrif Wilson, pleaded guilty after trial, agreeing to testify against An-
thony Yarbough, who had also falsely confessed, in exchange for a re-
duced sentence). In total, eighteen of sixty-six exonerees who falsely
confessed pleaded guilty. Some had lost suppression hearings and per-
haps were advised to plead guilty since the confession would be admit-
ted at trial, while others confessed and agreed to cooperate with police in
the prosecution of other innocent people in exchange for a reduced sen-
tence. Nine of the nineteen among these recent exonerees who had a trial
testified at trial. The exonerees typically denied having confessed and
described the circumstances of the interrogation. 3 1 For example, Ted
Bradford testified: "The detail I got from the detectives. I did not supply
any information at all."32
The table below summarizes some of the features of the most recent
twenty-six false confessions and situates them in the entire group of six-
ty-six false confessions among DNA exonerations that have occurred to
date in the United States.
30 Transcript of Trial at H-174, State v. Taylor, No. 95 CR 23475 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty., Ill.
Jan. 17, 1997) [hereinafter Taylor Trial Transcript].
31 Of the entire group of sixty-six exonerees, twenty-five testified at their own trial, typi-
cally recanting confession statements and describing how police pressured them to falsely
confess. Additionally, eight exonerees testified at co-defendants' trials (one of whom, Shariff
Wilson, also testified at his own trial), and seven testified at pretrial suppression hearings.
See infra Appendix.
32 Transcript of Trial at 1510, State v. Bradford, No. 96-1-00583-1 (Sup. Ct. Yakima
Cnty., Wash. June 12, 1996).
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Figure I. Characteristics of False Confessions in DNA Exonera-
tion Cases
Contaminated Interrogations
with Inside of More than Guilty pleas
Information 3 Hours
40 False Confessions 38 36 10
(1989-2009)
26 False Confessions 24 25 8
(2009-2014) 1 1
Total N
Tofl 6 a62 (94%) 61(92%) 18 (27%)(% of 66 cases)
B. Confessions Trumping DNA
The average year of conviction in this group of twenty-six exonerees
was 1993, and the average year of exoneration was 2011, making the
eighteen-year time lag from conviction to exoneration slightly longer
than that among DNA exonerees in general, which have had about a fif-
teen-year average duration from conviction to exoneration." What
makes these more recent false confession exoneration cases more trou-
bling is that many of them were convicted well into the modem DNA
era. DNA testing was first conducted postconviction in the United States
in 1989, and by the mid-i 990s, DNA tests became quite routine in crim-
inal investigations.3 4 Several of the most recent false confession DNA
exoneration cases involved decades-old convictions; two of these ex-
onerees, Curtis Jasper Moore (convicted in 1978) and Bobby Dixon
(convicted in 1980) had passed away before they were exonerated.35 But
33 See Garrett, Convicting the Innocent, supra note 1, at 215.
34 See Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 1629, 1659 (2008) (de-
scribing how while DNA testing was possible in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the im-
proved Short Tandem Repeat ("STR") testing became widely adopted by the mid-to-late
1990s, resulting in a sharp increase in the rate of DNA exonerations).
35 See Curtis Jasper Moore, Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/
CurtisJasper Moore.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2014); Bobby Ray Dixon, Innocence Project,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/BobbyRay.Dixon.php (last visited Oct. 19,
2014).
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most involved convictions in the 1990s at which time DNA tests could
have been conducted, and in some, they were conducted.
Eleven of the twenty-six most recent false confessions were cases in
which DNA tests excluded defendants at the time of their convictions.
This was the case in the Englewood Four and Dixmoor Five cases as
well as the third trial of Juan Rivera; all of these were Illinois cases. 36 In
addition, Kenneth Kagonyera pleaded guilty, as did his co-defendants,
despite DNA test results excluding them all.3 7 Jamie Lee Peterson's con-
fession statements changed after police received DNA tests excluding
him, and he then confessed to murdering the victim along with another
man. As the defense lawyer put it at trial: "There was no discussion re-
garding a second perpetrator until after they found Jamie was excluded"
by the DNA tests; that was when "they somehow started scrambling for
a second perpetrator theory."38
In the Englewood Four and Dixmoor Five cases, the prosecutors tried
to explain the absence of DNA (or any other forensics, such as hair
comparison or serology) linking any of the defendants to the attacks by
arguing that this was a group crime. In the Englewood case, the victim,
known to have abused drugs and engaged in prostitution, was found
strangled in a dumpster behind a liquor store.39 The four teenagers,
Thames, Richardson, Swift, and Saunders, each allegedly confessed to
the four of them all having sexually assaulted the victim, with each con-
fessing to this having occurred in a different order. Yet DNA extracted
from a vaginal swab had excluded all of them. The defense pointed out
at trial that the parties had stipulated at trial that the DNA did not match;
the State suggested that the biological evidence might have been degrad-
ed, but in fact, the lab found that male DNA could be identified and that
36 In the Rivera case, postexoneration DNA testing has since matched DNA test results
found in another murder committed while Rivera was in prison. Steve Mills & Dan Hinkel,
Same DNA Detected at Scenes of 2 Killings, Chi. Tribune, June 11, 2014, § 1, at 1. The
eleven cases are those of: James Edwards, Kenneth Kagonyera, Jamie Lee Peterson, Harold
Richardson, Juan Rivera (third trial), Michael Saunders, Shainne Sharp, Terrill Swift, Robert
Taylor, Vincent Thames, and Robert Lee Veal.
7 Clarke Morrison, Panel Probes New Innocence Claims, Asheville Citizen-Times, June 8,
2012, at Al.
38 Transcript of Trial at 158, People v. Peterson, No. 97-1707-FC(D) (Cir. Trial Ct.,
Kalkaska Cnty., Mich. Dec. 11, 1998).
3 Petition for Certificate of Innocence at 8, People v. Thames, No. 95 CR 09676 (Cir. Ct.
Cook Cnty., Ill., June 6, 2012) [hereinafter Thames Petition for Certificate of Innocence].
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it excluded the suspects.40 There was no other evidence; as the trial
judge had commented in the Swift trial, "[T]his case is really relatively
simple. It's all a confession.... We have got a 22 page confession, and
that is enough for me. There will be a finding of guilty." 4 ' The trial
judge also noted in the Richardson trial, "If there's a DNA link ... then
we're talking something different altogether."4 2 In 2010, new DNA tests
pointed to a man named Johnny Douglas, a "known serial killer," "con-
victed murderer with a proclivity for violently assaulting and strangling
women, particularly women willing to exchange sex for money or
drugs," a man who was in fact present at the crime scene in 1994 when
police found the body, and who at the time claimed not to have known
the victim. 43
The Dixmoor Five case similarly involved a group of youths, three of
whom had falsely confessed (the two others, with the support of their fa-
ther, refused to make a statement). The State called a DNA analyst from
the state crime lab, who testified that the samples contained a single
male profile, not that of the victim, which did not match any of the five
suspects in the case." The prosecutor implied that the victim, a fourteen-
year-old girl, could have had consensual sex up to seventy-two hours be-
fore the murder and that this might explain the presence of the unknown
male DNA. 45 However, no consensual male donor was ever identified by
the prosecutor. Instead, in closing arguments, the prosecutor empha-
sized: "I'm not saying that DNA is[n't] incredible evidence when it ap-
plies. It's great," but adding, "[L]adies and gentlemen .. .. We know
40 Transcript of Trial at K-66 to -68, State v. Swift, No. 95-9676 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty., Ill.
May 1, 1998) [hereinafter Swift Trial Transcript] ("It is conclusive evidence that [Swift] did
not leave any seminal fluid in there. How does that get explained? No other physical evi-
dence, merely, his statement.").
41 Id. at K-76, K-78.
42 Transcript of Trial at A-13, State v. Richardson, No. 95-9676 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty., Ill.
Dec. 18, 1997); see also Order to Vacate Convictions at 9, State v. Thames, No. 95 CR 9676
(Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty., Ill. Nov. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Thames Order to Vacate Convictions].
43 Thames Petition for Certificate of Innocence, supra note 39, at 1, 8; Petitioners' Joint
Opposition to the State's Motion to Dismiss at 2, Swift, No. 95-9676 (Sept. 28, 2011) (on file
with author); see also Thames Order to Vacate Convictions, supra note 42, at 4-8. Douglas
went on to assault additional victims following this murder and had an arrest report "includ-
ing eighty-three arrests and thirty-eight convictions." Thames Petition for Certificate of In-
nocence, supra note 39, at 7-8.
4 Transcript of Trial at L-19 to -22, L-33, State v. Barr, No. 95 CR 23475 (Cir. Ct. Cook
Cnty., Ill. Feb. 10, 1997).
4 Id. at L-34 to -35.
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this girl was sexually active." 46 The prosecutor added that as to the DNA
profile, "We do not know who that belongs to. We will never know."47
However, a crime lab analyst also testified that there were hairs found
on the victim's body that were dissimilar to the victim and also did not
match any of the five youths. In 2011, new DNA tests pointed to a
then-recently paroled rapist, twenty years older than the five boys, with
no known connection to the victim.4 9
The prosecutors' explanation for the DNA exclusion in the Juan Rive-
ra case was similarly quite strained, but nevertheless the jury convicted
Rivera of murder for a third time despite DNA tests. The prosecution
theory was that either the eleven-year-old victim had been sexually ac-
tive at the time, and so any DNA did not come from the murderer, or
that the DNA sample was somehow contaminated.so
A total of nineteen of the entire group of sixty-six exonerees who
falsely confessed had DNA test results that excluded them at the time of
the conviction." The confessions seemed to "trump" the DNA test re-
sults in those nineteen cases, as Professor Saul Kassin has put it.5 2 Pro-
fessors Saul Kassin, Jeff Kukucka, and Itiel Dror, in a series of studies,
have described how confession evidence can taint perceptions of other
evidence in a case; confirmation bias can cause investigators not to pur-
sue other evidence, view inculpatory evidence as stronger than it is, and
discount exculpatory evidence.5 3
46 Id. at P-24 to -25.
47 Id.
48 Taylor Trial Transcript, supra note 30, at N-88 to-89 (Jan. 15, 1997). For a detailed de-
scription of the cases, see Joshua A. Tepfer & Laura H. Nirider, Adjudicated Juveniles and
Collateral Relief, 64 Me. L. Rev. 553, 568-73 (2012).
49 Steve Mills, DNA Evidence Links Man to 1991 Murder, May Clear 5 Convicted in
Case, Chi. Tribune (Apr. 15, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-04-15/news/ct-
met-dixmoor-dna-0415-20110414 1 murder-dna-evidence-links-man-dna-tests.
5o Emily S. Achenbaum & Steve Mills, Third Trial for 1992 Killing, Chi. Trib., Apr. 12,
2009, § 2, at 1 (noting that "one of the nation's top DNA experts" disputed the prosecution
contamination theory).
51 Garrett, Convicting the Innocent, supra note 1, at 35 (stating that eight exonerees among
the forty who had falsely confessed had DNA exclude them at trial, and the eight were not
exonerated until subsequent DNA tests not only excluded them but also inculpated others).
52 See Saul M. Kassin, Why Confessions Trump Innocence, 67 Am. Psychol. 431, 431,
440-41 (2012); Andrew Martin, The Prosecution's Case Against DNA, N.Y. Times Maga-
zine, Nov. 27, 2011, at 44 ("More often, though, the fate of an inmate with powerful new
evidence of innocence still rests with local prosecutors, some of whom have spun creative
theories to explain away the exculpatory findings.").
5 See Saul M. Kassin, Itiel E. Dror & Jeff Kukucka, The Forensic Confirmation Bias:
Problems, Perspectives, and Proposed Solutions, 2 J. Applied Res. Memory & Cognition 42,
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Confirmation bias may also help to explain why in still additional
cases, like that of Ted Bradford in Washington State, prosecutors pur-
sued a retrial despite DNA test results excluding him; in that case, how-
ever, the jury acquitted.5 4 In Damon Thibodeaux's case, a death penalty
case tried in 1997, no DNA testing was conducted; the prosecution took
pains to question the investigators on why none was conducted, to bring
out that if you have a "known perpetrator" and if "somebody confesses,"
then you do not "need DNA to tell you who he is."ss In general, evi-
dence, whether forensic evidence, alibi evidence, evidence pointing to
the guilt of others, or inconsistencies in confession statements them-
selves, was disregarded. What about these confessions made them so
powerful? The answer lies in the problem of confession contamination.
C. Confession Contamination
Confession contamination is overwhelmingly prevalent in false con-
fessions among persons exonerated by DNA tests, as I have detailed
elsewhere.5 6 DNA testing provides us with "something like a crystal
ball," allowing us to uncover how supposedly detailed confession state-
ments could have been made by a person who we now know to have
been innocent." As I have described, unless that "inside information"
about the crime had been casually released to the public by the investi-
gators and then somehow retained and accurately parroted back by a de-
ceptive suspect, or unless the entire confession statement was fabricated
whole-cloth, the most likely scenario is that the innocent convict had de-
tails disclosed during a lengthy interrogation. Police may do so inten-
tionally, to "feed facts" in violation of their training, but it may also
happen completely unintentionally, since interrogations can be such
complex affairs in which police offer suspects a set of complicated and
43-48 (2013); Kassin, supra note 52, at 440-41; Jeff Kukucka & Saul M. Kassin, Do Con-
fessions Taint Perceptions of Handwriting Evidence? An Empirical Test of the Forensic
Confirmation Bias, 38 Law & Hum. Behav. 256, 256 (2013).
54 Ted Bradford, Nat'l Registry of Exonerations, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3040 (last visited Feb. 2, 2015).
ss Transcript of Trial at 85, 185, State v. Thibodeaux, No. 96-4522 (Dist. Ct. Jefferson Par-
ish, La. Oct. 4, 1997) (on file with author).
56 Garrett, Convicting the Innocent, supra note 1, at 14-44.
5 Mark A. Godsey, Reliability Lost, False Confessions Discovered, 10 Chap. L. Rev. 623,
623 (2007).
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increasingly inculpatory accounts of the crime in an effort to secure a
confession."
All but two of these most recent twenty-six confessions included
crime scene details that supposedly were corroborated by crime scene
information that only investigators and the culprit could have known.
The first case was that of William Avery, who refused to sign a confes-
sion statement after the detective tried to secure his agreement to a
statement in which he allegedly admitted responsibility but without ex-
plaining how the crime took place. The second was the case of Johnny
Williams, in which the officers had hoped to "see if he would give us
specific case details" so that they could "come to the conclusion that he
has information that he wouldn't normally have unless he was there,"
but they received "[n]ot any, nothing substantial."5 9 Williams had initial-
ly said, "I don't remember. I can't say I do. I don't remember. I was
high. If I did, I was high. I don't know." 60 After the officers told him that
they had him on a surveillance video and that DNA matched him,
among other fabrications, he finally broke down and said, "I guess I did
it. I guess I did it. I did everything." 6 1 He could not describe what he did
though, although the officers did tell him what the basic charges were.
Still other innocent people may resist efforts by police to secure a
confession. For example, DNA exoneree David Ayers did so and refused
to confess; therefore he is not one of the twenty-six cases studied here.
However, it is not hard to see how his case could have included a false
confession. Following a murder in Cleveland public housing, Ayers was
interrogated multiple times by two detectives, told he failed a "voice
stress test," and that tapes of phone records of calls to the victim would
show that he was lying.62 At one point he did ask that if he admitted he
58 Garrett, Convicting the Innocent, supra note 1, at 28; Garrett, The Substance of False
Confessions, supra note 1, at 1068, 1079; see also Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Caus-
es, Consequences, and Implications, 37 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 332, 337 (2009) ("In-
terrogators help create the false confession by pressuring the suspect to accept a particular
account and by suggesting facts of the crime to him, thereby contaminating the suspect's
postadmission narrative. ... If the entire interrogation is captured on audio or video record-
ing, then it may be possible to trace, step by step, how and when the interrogator implied or
suggested the correct answers for the suspect to incorporate into his postadmission narra-
tive.").
5 Williams Trial Transcript, supra note 17, at 1424-26 (Apr. 7, 2000).
60 Id. at 328 (quoting from Williams' initial statement to police),
61 Id. at 330.
62 Transcript of Trial at 211-14, 217, 225, State v. Ayers, No. CR-388738,
(Ct. Com. Pl. Cuyahoga Cnty., Ohio Dec. 11, 2000).
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hit the victim, could he go home, but he would not confess, leaving the
detectives with "this feeling that we had that he was about to tell us
something."6' Nevertheless, law enforcement secured an informant who
testified at trial that Ayers had confessed in jail, and Ayers was convict-
ed in 2000, despite surveillance video footage confirming his alibi, only
to be exonerated in 2011 by DNA tests. 64 And still additional cases in-
volve inculpatory statements that can similarly be undocumented and
contaminated but that were not part of a full confession or admission to
the crime. For example, in the case of Anthony Johnson, law enforce-
ment made much of the fact that during his interrogation, he did not con-
fess, but police claimed, in a written report created two months after the
fact, that he had said, "I wouldn't have killed her like that .... [w]ith
the pick and fork."65 Johnson testified that it was the officer who told
him en route to the police station that the victim was stabbed and that, as
the victim's boyfriend, he knew she kept an icepick and fork under her
pillow for protection when he was not home.66
A total of ninety-four percent, or sixty-two of sixty-six false confes-
sions by DNA exonerees to date, were contaminated by such allegedly
"inside" information.6 7 Almost without exception, these confession
statements were contaminated with crime scene details which these in-
nocent suspects, as we now know, could not have themselves been fa-
miliar with until they learned of them from law enforcement.
In these recent exonerations, the detectives similarly denied having
disclosed any such information to the exonerees when asked by the de-
fense about the source of the details contained in the confession state-
ments; they did so in all but one of the fourteen cases in which there was
a trial.6' After all, police training on the subject is very clear: One does
not ask leading questions or disclose key facts concerning the crime. The
63 Id. at 221, 229.
6 David Ayers, Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/DavidAyers.php
(last visited Oct. 16, 2014). Another recent exoneree who was interrogated but did not confess was
Robert Dewey. Robert Dewey, Innocence Project, available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/
Content/Robert Dewey.php (last visited Oct. 16, 2014).
65 Transcript of Trial at 76, State v. Johnson, No. 2007-KP-2034 (Jud. Dist. Ct. Washing-
ton Parish, La. Feb. 25, 1986).
" Id. at 211.
67 See Garrett, Convicting the Innocent, supra note 1, at 20; infra Appendix (describing
facts present in twenty-four of the twenty-six most recent confessions).
68 See the expanded Appendix, supra note 3, for quotations from law enforcement in these
cases. Detectives also denied feeding facts in cases involving guilty pleas, such as the Dix-
moor and Englewood cases.
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leading manual on police interrogations, the Inbau and Reid treatise,
now in its Fifth Edition, has long been emphatic that officers are to
withhold from the public key facts and then ask nonleading questions to
solicit that information, without disclosing them to the suspect.69 One
police officer at an exoneree trial therefore explained:
Well, when you're conducting an interview, you want the subject to
give you information-certain information about the crime that only
the killer would be aware of.
So you let him give you that information so this way you know that
he was at the scene, he was involved, 'cause this is information that
only the killer would know.o
Prosecutors similarly emphasized in their arguments that these confes-
sions included details that only the killer could have known." For exam-
ple, in the Frank Sterling case, the prosecutors said:
How does the defendant know it's a purple jacket or purple top? A
guess? Instead of saying yellow, red, orange, blue, black, green, gray,
brown? He just guesses purple? And what is she wearing? A purple
jacket, coincidentally, a two tone sweater. . .. [This was] never re-
leased to the media, held back from the media, was the purple jacket.72
In Terrill Swift's case, the prosecutor stated in the opening argument
that "[y]ou will see from the physical evidence, from the medical exam-
iner that that confession is corroborated by the injuries that this victim
suffered."7 3 In the closing arguments, the prosecutor then concluded,
"[L]ook at the details of this confession .... You have to make a judg-
69 See Inbau et al., 4th ed., supra note 25, at 369 ("When developing corroborative infor-
mation, the investigator must be certain that the details were not somehow revealed to the
suspect through the questioning process, news media, or the viewing of crime scene photo-
graphs."). The most recent edition modifies that language slightly. Inbau et al., 5th ed., supra
note 25, at 315, 355 ("It is highly important ... that the investigator let the confessor supply
the details of the occurrence and, to this end, the investigator should avoid or at least mini-
mize the use of leading questions . .. the lead investigator should decide and document on
the case folder what information will be kept secret."); see also Garrett, The Substance of
False Confessions, supra note 1, at 1066-67 (describing police training on avoiding contam-
ination).
7o Taylor Trial Transcript, supra note 30, at MMM-42.
71 See the expanded Appendix, supra note 3, for quotations from prosecutors' opening and
closing arguments in these cases.
72 Transcript of Trial at 1433, People v. Sterling, No. 91-0624 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. Monroe
Cnty. Sept. 29, 1992).
7 Swift Trial Transcript, supra note 40, at A-7 (Apr. 28, 1998).
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ment call of someone's credibility based on all of the evidence that this
defendant was not fed these details."74 In Anthony Yarbough's case, the
prosecutor called it "preposterous" to suggest
that those detectives had the brilliance and the ability and the capabil-
ity of concocting a story and a confession that would actually make
sense; that would sound right, and that they could then take
that . .. and convince him and feed him and have all of this done by
2:45 in the afternoon, and have him actually regurgitate the whole sto-
ry.
Absurd.
The brothers Henry McCollum and Leon Brown were both sen-
tenced to death in 1984 for a brutal murder of an eleven-year-old girl
in the tiny town of Red Springs, North Carolina. For decades, that
crime, in which the victim was found raped and murdered by having
her panties stuffed down her throat using a stick, was held out as the
type of case that the death penalty was made for. At trial, one of the
officers who interrogated McCollum claimed that all of the details he
had volunteered came from him: "We didn't have to use any tech-
nique. He was cooperative from the time we picked him up."7 The
officer continued: "I didn't ask him questions. He would volunteer
some things and I would ask him some things."7 8
McCollum was an intellectually disabled nineteen-year-old who
testified that he had always maintained his innocence but signed a
statement without knowing what was in it because police said that he
could then leave.79 His brother, Leon Brown, was an intellectually
74 Id. at K-71 (May 1, 1998).
7 Transcript of Trial at 1013, People v. Yarbough, No. 7325/92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings
Cny. Feb. 16, 1994).
Eric Garcia, Henry McCollum's Innocence and the Stakes for Death Row Inmates in a
Red State, American Prospect, Sept. 25, 2014, http://prospect.org/article/henry-mccollum%
E2%80%99s-innocence-and-stakes-death-row-inmates-red-state (describing how McCollum
was used as a "poster child" by pro-death penalty politicians in North Carolina (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).
7 Transcript of Trial at 1373, State v. McCollum, No. 83 CRS 15506-15507, 15822-15823
(N.C. Super. Ct. Robeson Cnty. Oct. 23, 1984) [hereinafter McCollum and Brown Trial
Transcript].
78 Id.
79 Id., at 1150, 1166, 1288, 1546, 1567, 1570; see also Jonathan M. Katz & Erik Eckholm,
DNA Evidence Clears Two Men in 1983 Murder, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 2014, at Al, availa-
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/03/us/2-convicted-in-1983-north-carolina-murder-
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disabled fifteen-year-old who testified that he similarly insisted on
his innocence, and could not read cursive and had no idea what was
in the confession statement police pressured him to sign: "I looked at
the paper real close. I said, 'No, sir. I don't understand the paper."'o
Both brothers were interrogated for many hours into the night, by
multiple police officers."' Both brothers denied any knowledge of the
detailed facts concerning the crime, from the way that the victim was
killed, to the location of the crime, to a plank of wood that the victim
was found on, to the Newport cigarettes smoked at the crime scene,
to the six-pack of Bull Malt Liquor Schlitz found at the scene. 82 None
of the physical evidence or forensics, such as fingerprint evidence,
matched the brothers, and while the brothers had supposedly con-
fessed to participating with three others, there was no effort to prose-
cute those they supposedly said primarily carried out the murder.8
One of the lead interrogators testified that he himself did not know
any of those details and therefore could not have suggested the facts
to McCollum or Brown; when asked, for example, "[D]id you know
anything about the Schlitz Bull Malt Liquor beer or a plastic holder
for beer cans?" he responded, "No, sir. I had never been to the crime
scene."8 4 One of the interrogators was a forensic expert from the state
crime lab, who the prosecutor admitted was "the crime scene man"
and who one of the officers admitted was there to "either confirm or
freed-after-dna-tests.html?_r-0 (describing the case and how DNA exonerated the defend-
ants).
so McCollum and Brown Trial Transcript, supra note 77, at 1317, 1320, 1656.
s" Id. at 1147-62, 1170.
82 Id. at 1636-38, 1648 (denying that defendant told police any of the long list of facts con-
tained in confession statement); id. at 1338 (noting that Brown stated he had no knowledge
of anything in the statement, stating "[t]hat ain't true and you know it yourself').
8 Id. at 1791-92 (highlighting how none of the "victim's blood was on that clothing"
worn by the defendants, and how "[w]e don't have any footprints matched up," or "hair
samples," or "any semen that matches up with any blood type of the defendants" during de-
fense's closing argument). The prosecutor responded that the "fingerprints [found on beer
cans at the crime scene] were smudged," and how the detailed facts in the confession state-
ments were corroborated by the autopsy and crime scene investigation. Id. at 1816. The con-
fession statements described three others, two of whom were said to have raped and asphyx-
iated the victim. Id. at 1360-64, 1392-95. None of the three were charged after their alibis
were confirmed and evidence failed to connect them to the murder. See Henry McCollum,
Case Detail, National Registry of Exonerations (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4492.
84 McCollum and Brown Trial Transcript, supra note 77, at 1362.
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deny the truth as it came out," since he was knowledgeable about the
crime scene."
In response to the suggestion that these statements may have been
fabricated whole-cloth by the police, the prosecutor argued in his
closing statement:
The [defense] lawyer stood up here and argued to you that the of-
ficers, by some sort of foul means, pulled this confession out of
these two defendants. Is that what their evidence is? Their evidence
is that they never made a statement of any kind and that the officer
just sat down and made up these statements . . . . Now, come on,
folks. They must think you were born yesterday to swallow some-
thing like that.8
Damon Thibodeaux alleged contamination of his confession state-
ment on appeal and argued that the detective "talked to him while the
tape recorder was turned off' in order to feed him facts concerning
the crime. The appellate courts concluded, however, that "there is
no due process requirement that a statement given to the police must
be recorded" and found the statements voluntary and reliable "in the
absence of proof to the contrary."1 Of course, without a recording of
the entire interrogation, there was no way to prove whether police did
feed those facts-until the DNA tests were performed in the case.
The officer in James Edwards's case explained that "we wanted to
gather all the information first to make sure it was accurate, and then
we offered him the opportunity if he wished to be on videotape"; they
did not videotape the interrogation.8 9
These specific crime scene details were powerful enough that in-
vestigators, prosecutors, judges, and juries overlooked the lack of fit
in so many of the confession statements: Many of the details provid-
ed by these individuals were inconsistent with the crime scene evi-
dence. In these most recent twenty-six cases, twenty of the cases in-
as Id. at 1372, 1810.86 Id. at 1819-20.
8 State v. Thibodeaux, 750 So. 2d 916, 923 (La. 1999).88 Id.; State v. Lefevre, 419 So. 2d 862, 867 (La. 1982).89 Transcript of Trial at 55, State v. Edwards, No. 96 CF 42 (Cir. Ct. Lake Cnty., Ill. Dec.
6, 1996). Illinois now videotapes interrogations. 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/103-2.1(b) (2014).
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cluded facts inconsistent with crime scene information."o Had there
been complete recordings of the interrogation statements, one might
have been able to observe that when asked nonleading questions, the-
se innocent people volunteered incorrect information and that they
could only offer correct information when prompted. Absent such a
recording, prosecutors could and did argue that these people were
purposefully lying about some aspects of the crime, and that the "in-
side information" they offered betrayed their guilt.91
II. A SCIENTIFIC FRAMEWORK FOR REVIEWING CONFESSION EVIDENCE
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated, "A confession is like no other
evidence."92 However, the Court's rulings, and state court rulings and
procedures, have not yet reflected a careful understanding of what
makes confession evidence different. There is now a growing and de-
tailed body of empirical evidence concerning the impact, reliability,
and potential unreliability of confession evidence. As Professor Saul
Kassin puts it: "False confession is not a phenomenon that is known
to the average layperson as a matter of common sense."93 Although
"mock jury studies have shown that confessions have more impact on
verdicts than do other potent forms of evidence," at the same time,
"People do not adequately discount confessions-even when they are
retracted and judged to be the result of coercion, even when jurors are
told that the confessor suffered from psychological illness or interro-
gation-induced stress."9 4 Moreover, innocent people may actually be
at risk during interrogations, believing, naively perhaps, that they will
90 A total of fifty of the sixty-six cases involved such inconsistent facts. Still additional
cases involved differing accounts by codefendants. See Garrett, Convicting the Innocent,
sugra note 1, at 33-35 (noting cases involving false confessions based on inconsistent facts).
See id. at 34.
92 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991).
93 Kassin, Why Confessions Trump Innocence, supra note 52, at 433.
94 Id at 433-34 (citations omitted); see also Sara C. Appleby et al., Police-Induced Confes-
sions: An Empirical Analysis of Their Content and Impact, Psychol. Crime & Law, Dec.
2001, at 1-2 (discussing impact of confession evidence on mock jurors and still greater im-
pact of more detailed narrative confession evidence); Danielle E. Chojnacki et al., An Empir-
ical Basis for the Admission of Expert Testimony on False Confessions, 40 Ariz. St. L.J. 1,
39-40 (2008) (discussing misperceptions of confessions); Mark Costanzo et al., Juror Beliefs
About Police Interrogations, False Confessions, and Expert Testimony, 7 J. Empirical Legal
Stud. 231, 233-34 (2010).
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clear their names if they cooperate with law enforcement requests to
provide inculpatory statements.95
Recording entire interrogations is an important first step. Far too
few police departments record entire interrogations, although this is
changing. Fifteen states and the District of Columbia now require re-
cording of at least some interrogations in statutes, typically in homi-
cide and other serious felony cases, with varying provisions concern-
ing admissibility consequences of any failure to do so, 96 while five
others do so as a result of judicial rulings;97 and still other jurisdic-
9 Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents at
Risk?, 60 Am. Psychologist 215, 222-24 (2005).
96 Cal. Penal Code § 859.5 (Deering 2014) (requiring recordings for juveniles suspected of
murder with an exception for "exigent circumstances"); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-lo(b), (d)
(2013) (requiring recordings for suspects of capital or class A or B felonies and that state-
ments made during or after unrecorded interrogations be presumptively inadmissible); D.C.
Code § 5-116.01(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2012) (requiring police to record all custodial investiga-
tions for violent crimes); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/103-2.1(b) (2012) (requiring police to record
interrogations in all homicide cases); 725 111. Comp. Stat. 5/103-2.1(b-5) (2014) (expanding
range of felonies for which recording is required for adult suspects); 705 Ill. Comp. Stat.
405/5-401.5(b-5) (2014) (expanding range of felonies for which recording is required for
juvenile suspects); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 25, § 2803-B(1)(K) (2013) (mandating recording
"interviews of suspects in serious crimes"); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 2-402(1) (Lex-
isNexis 2008) (requiring that law enforcement make "reasonable efforts" to record certain
felony interrogations "whenever possible"); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 763.8(2), 763.9
(West 2014) (requiring recordings for individuals suspected of major felonies); Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 590.700(2) (2013) (requiring recording for certain felonies); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-4-
408 (West 2013) (requiring the recording of all custodial interrogations); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§§ 29-4503, -4504 (2008) (requiring recording for interrogations relating to certain offenses
and providing for jury instructions in the event of failure to do so); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-
16 (West 2011) (requiring recordings of all custodial interrogations); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
211 (2013) (requiring complete electronic recording of custodial interrogations in homicide
cases); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2933.81(B) (LexisNexis 2010) (providing for a presumption
of voluntariness for recorded statements made in response to interrogation); Or. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 133.400(1) (West 2014) (requiring the recording of interrogations of suspects for ag-
gravated murder, crimes requiring imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence, or adult
prosecution of juvenile offenders); Vt .Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 5581(b)(1), (2) (2014) (requiring
recording of entire interrogations in homicide and sexual assault investigations, with a bur-
den on prosecutors to show by a preponderance of the evidence than an exception justified
failure to comply); Wis. Stat. §§ 968.073(2), 972.115(2) (2012) (requiring recording of felo-
ny interrogations and permitting a jury instruction if interrogation not recorded); see also
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22, § 3(a)(1), (c) (West 2014) (rendering unrecorded oral
statements inadmissible unless the statement contains "assertions of facts or circumstances
that are found to be true").
9 Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985) ("[A]n unexcused failure to elec-
tronically record a custodial interrogation conducted in a place of detention violates a sus-
pect's right to due process . . . ."); State v. Hajtic, 724 N.W.2d 449, 456 (Iowa 2006)
("[E]lectronic recording, particularly videotaping, of custodial interrogations should be en-
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tions, including federal law enforcement agencies, now record inter-
rogations pursuant to official memoranda and policies. Still other
jurisdictions have considered adopting recording requirements in re-
cent years.99 Agencies report positive experiences when requiring
electronic recordings, because video records frequently provide clear
documentation that interrogations were conducted professionally.100
couraged, and we take this opportunity to do so."); State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592
(Minn. 1994) ("[A]lI questioning shall be electronically recorded where feasible and must be
recorded when questioning occurs at a place of detention."); State v. Cook, 847 A.2d 530,
547 (N.J. 2004) ("[W]e will establish a committee to study and make recommendations on
the use of electronic recordation of custodial interrogations."); In re Jerrell CJ., 699 N.W.2d
110, 123 (Wis. 2005) ("[W]e exercise our supervisory power to require that all custodial in-
terrogation of juveniles in future cases be electronically recorded where feasible, and without
exception when questioning occurs at a place of detention."); see also N.J. Ct. R. 3:17(a)
(following Cook, requiring electronic recording of custodial interrogations); Commonwealth
v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 535 (Mass. 2004) (allowing defense to point out failure
to record interrogation and calling unrecorded admissions "less reliable"); State v. Barnett,
789 A.2d 629, 632 (N.H. 2001) ("[I]mmediately following the valid waiver of a defendant's
Miranda rights, a tape-recorded interrogation will not be admitted into evidence unless the
statement is recorded in its entirety.").
98 Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice, Policy
Concerning Electronic Recording of Statements 1 (May 12, 2014),
http://archive.azcentral.com/ic/pdf/DOJ-policy-electronic-recording.pdf, Me. Criminal Jus-
tice Acad., Mandatory Policy: Recording of Suspects in Serious Crimes & the Preservation
of Notes & Records 1 (Jan. 11, 2012), available at http://www.maine.gov/dps/mcja/links/
index.htm (model policy requiring local police to formulate similar policies "[recognizing]
the importance of recording custodial interrogations related to serious crimes"); R.I. Police
Accreditation Comm'n, Accreditation Standards Manual 44-45 (May 2013), available at
http://ripolicechiefs.org/images/RIPAC AccreditationStandardsManual - First Edition
May_2013.pdf (requiring recording of all interrogations of suspects for capital offenses); see
also Consent Decree Regarding the New Orleans Police Department at 46, United States v.
New Orleans, No. 12-1924, 2013 WL 2297208 (E.D. La. May 24, 2013) (mandating that all
custodial interrogations of homicide or sexual assault suspects must be recorded in their en-
tirety). For a list of agencies that record interrogations, see Thomas P. Sullivan, The Time
Has Come for Law Enforcement Recordings of Custodial Interviews, Start to Finish, 37
Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 175 app. 1 (2006). Regarding the lack of uniformity and adoption of
recordings in jurisdictions that adopt them only pursuant to recommended best practices or
guidelines, see Thomas P. Sullivan, Arguing for Statewide Uniformity in Recording Custo-
dial Interrogations, 29 Crim. Just. 21, 22 (2014), available at http://www.nlada.org/forensics/
forlib/Documents/ 107449792.59/5e336a318e50295185256f81007887bl %3FOpenDocum
entd.
99 Custodial Interrogation Recording Compendium by State, Nat'l Ass'n of Crim. Def.
Law., http://www.nacdl.org/usmap/crim/30262/48121/d/ (last updated July 1, 2014) (de-
scribing legislation introduced but not enacted in Arizona, New York, North Dakota, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, and Tennessee).
00 See Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, supra note 1, at 1113-14; Saul M.
Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation, supra note 2, at 385; Thomas P. Sullivan
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However, even the important step of recording entire interrogations is
not enough; legal consequences should result if a recording docu-
ments a coercive or contaminated interrogation. A scientific frame-
work should govern confession evidence that provides guiding prin-
ciples for the set of evidentiary and constitutional rules that regulate
confession evidence.
As noted, scholars have advocated for a renewed focus on reliabil-
ity of confession evidence, including at pretrial hearings, but also
through the use of expert and other evidence.1o' I describe in the sec-
tions that follow those proposals that, taken together, are consistent
with applying a scientific framework to inform the development, re-
view, and litigation of confession evidence. I propose that judges take
judicial notice of such scientific framework evidence and that judges,
lawyers, legislators, and policymakers consider the use of such evi-
dence to inform interrogation procedures, pretrial hearings, expert ev-
idence, jury instructions, and postconviction review. Confession evi-
dence at all stages should be informed by scientific research,
particularly given its importance in a wide range of criminal cases. 102
Doing so can also encourage the use of less coercive and more accu-
rate techniques during interrogations. Nor should we be overly con-
cerned with the result of making litigation of confession evidence
overly complex.10 3 Currently, pretrial suppression hearings already
& Andrew W. Vail, The Consequences of Law Enforcement Officials' Failure to Record
Custodial Interviews as Required by Law, 99 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 215, 221 (2009);
Adam Liptak, Taping of Interrogations Is Praised by Police, N.Y. Times, June 13, 2004, at
N35; Thomas P. Sullivan, The Police Experience: Recording Custodial Interrogations,
Champion, Dec. 2004, at 24.
101 See sources cited supra note 94; see also Nirider et al., supra note 7, at 859-62 (propos-
ing that judges entertain a "pretrial motion in limine requesting the suppression of the con-
fession squarely on reliability-not voluntariness-grounds").
102 Confession evidence is also important in many civil cases, including civil commitment
and detention cases, as well as Section 1983 litigation and commercial litigation. E.g.
McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 45 (2002) (finding a state may require waiver of Fifth
Amendment rights as a condition of a sexual offender treatment program); Warney v. New
York, 947 N.E.2d 639, 641 (N.Y. 2011) (civil wrongful conviction claim); Brandon L. Gar-
rett, Corporate Confessions, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 917, 918-21 (2009) (discussing the role of
inculpatory statements in corporate criminal prosecutions and internal corporate investiga-
tions).
103 Additional research should examine how confession evidence is litigated in routine
criminal cases. When I examined the trials of the first 310 DNA exonerees, to assess whether
the presence of a confession was associated with a more lengthy trial, I found no such rela-
tionship when examining just a few basic variables, to be sure (although I often did not have
transcripts of pretrial suppression hearings). Examining length of trial (in days), whether
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occur in cases involving confessions, and they can be quite complex.' 04
While not all courts permit expert testimony on confessions, they cur-
rently permit police to explain their interrogation techniques in a manner
that largely resembles expert testimony.
A. Scientific and Empirical Research on Confessions
As Justice Souter wrote in Corley v. United States, "[T]here is mount-
ing empirical evidence that [custodial police interrogation] can induce a
frighteningly high percentage of people to confess to crimes they never
committed."'o There is a large and growing body of research on false
confessions, of several types, including survey and archival research and
experimental research. Major books have been published on false con-
fessions.' 0 6 The American Psychological Association, the largest profes-
sional and scientific organization in the field, has published reviews of
there was a confession, and whether the case involved a murder conviction or not, there was
only a modest but statistically insignificant effect in which trials resulting in a murder con-
viction were longer. I thank Vahid Gholampour for his assistance in conducting these regres-
sions. Adding information about the numbers of witnesses each side called at trial further
reduced the size of the effects as well as the numbers of observations (and numbers of wit-
nesses would be expected to be somewhat correlated with the length of trial in days). The
results are displayed below, with R-squared of 0.2274 and 207 observations (for many ex-
oneree trials there was incomplete information):
Trial Coeff. Std. Err. t P>|tl [95% Conf. Interval]
Murder 3.86952 0.5491252 7.05 2.7868 4.952241
Death -0.3716188 0.9240447 -0.40 -2.193575 1.450338
Confession -0.305602 0.7053088 -0.43 -1.696273 1.085069
Constant 3.704735 0.2856566 12.97 3.1415 4.267969
104 For example, the suppression hearings in one high-profile case in New York City were
trial length and scheduled to last about three weeks. Pervaiz Shallwani, Etan Patz's Parents
in Court for Pedro Hernandez's Video Confession, Wall St. J. Online, Sept. 15, 2014,
http://online.wsj.com/articles/parents-of-etan-patz-whose-1979-kidnapping-gripped-new-
york-in-court-to-see-video-of-pedro-hemandez-confess-to-his-killing- 1410791032.
105 556 U.S. 303, 321 (2009).
106 See Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions: A Hand-
book, vii-xii (2003); Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations, Confessions
and Testimony v-viii (1992); G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner, Police Interroga-
tions and False Confessions: Current Research, Practice, and Policy Recommendations xi-
xvii (2010); Interrogations, Confessions, and Entrapment xv-xix (G. Daniel Lassiter ed.,
2004); Investigative Interviewing: Rights, Research and Regulation,v-vi (Tom Williamson
ed., 2006); Lawrence S. Wrightsman & Saul M. Kassin, Confessions in the Courtroom 84-
100 (1993).
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the psychology of confessions, and has submitted important amicus
briefs that describe the literature.o Indeed, one of those amicus briefs
was submitted in DNA exoneree Juan Rivera's case.108 As the American
Psychological Association ("APA") has put it, "The body of research on
the causes of false confessions and their effects on trial outcomes is well
established and widely accepted within the field of psychology."l 09 A
division of the APA, the American Psychology-Law Society ("AP-LS"),
issued a white paper in 2010 on false confession research."o As re-
searchers and the APA underscore, this research is counterintuitive to
most people, who assume that an innocent person would not falsely con-
fess, and certainly neither would nor could falsely confess in seemingly
accurate detail.' Judges should take judicial notice of this research.
And, as noted, scholars have proposed that judges conduct pretrial hear-
ings to examine the reliability of confession evidence.112 As the follow-
ing sections will describe, courts have increasingly considered this re-
search when examining the voluntariness of confessions, the
admissibility of expert evidence regarding confessions, and when exam-
ining postconviction claims related to confession evidence.
B. Interrogation Practices and Policy
Most important is that police adopt measures to prevent contamina-
tion of interrogation evidence in the first instance. Videotaping entire in-
terrogations is an important first step towards averting contamination. In
107 See Lassiter & Meissner, supra note 106, at xi-xvii (providing scholarly reviews on
confessions published by the American Psychological Association); see, e.g., Brief for
American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Floyd v. Cain,
62 So.3d 57 (La. 2011) (No. 280-729 "C"), available at https://www.apa.org/about/
offices/ogc/amicus/floyd.aspx; Brief for American Psychological Association as Amicus Cu-
riae Supporting Claimant, Warney v. State, 947 N.E.2d 639 (N.Y. 2011) (No. CA 08 02261),
available at https://www.apa.org/about/offices/ogc/amicus/warney.aspx; Brief for American
Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Commonwealth v.
Wright, 14 A.3d 798 (Pa. 2011) (No. 21 EAP 2008), available at https://www.apa.org/
about/offices/ogc/amicus/wright.aspx.
1os Brief for American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant,
People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (No. 2-09-1060), available at https://
www.apa.org/about/offices/ogc/amicus/rivera.aspx [hereinafter Rivera Amicus Brief].
109 Id. at 4.
110 Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions, Risk Factors, and Recommenda-
tions: Looking Ahead, 34 Law & Hum. Behav. 49, 49-52 (2010).
1 Rivera Amicus Brief, supra note 108, at 4.
112 See Leo et al., supra note 9, at 764-65.
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addition to voluntarily recording interrogations, written police policies
should describe the steps to be followed when properly recording an in-
terrogation, including at what angles the cameras should be placed, and
what should be put on the record if there is a break in the recording.
There are model law enforcement policies that lay out these steps and
can inform police training and supervision.1 13 Additionally, model poli-
cies and training guide police on how to take particular care to avoid
contamination of interrogations and coercion of particularly vulnerable
suspects, such as juveniles and mentally ill or intellectually disabled per-
sons.114 Not only may a turn towards less coercive and deceptive tech-
niques during interrogations help to avoid false confessions, but police
may also adopt policies designed to track key nonpublic facts in a case
to avoid disclosing those facts during an interrogation. Forensic psy-
chologist Greg DeClue has proposed the use of checklists to track a
"holdback list" of known and unknown details of the crime, and then to
document inside information volunteered by a suspect during a recorded
interview or interrogation.1 5
Police could conduct interrogations "blind," such that the interroga-
tors are not aware of certain crime scene details, and cannot leak such
information during the questioning. In a number of DNA exoneree cas-
es, the interrogators claimed not to have been familiar with certain crime
scene information; we now suspect they must have been quite familiar,
since as those same officers later maintained, no innocent suspect could
have plausibly guessed such detailed information.1 16 Proper policies to
ensure that the interrogators do not know certain details, and can only
113 N.Y. State Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., Recording of Custodial Interrogations Mod-
el Policy (2013) (providing a model policy concerning recording interrogations); Int'l Ass'n
of Chiefs of Police, Electronic Recording of Interrogations and Confessions Model Policy
(2006) (laying out a detailed model policy providing procedures for electronic recording of
interrogations).
114 See, e.g., Int'l Ass'n of Chiefs of Police, Interviewing and Interrogating Juveniles
Model Policy (2012) (detailed policy concerning questioning of juveniles); Ken Jenne,
Broward Cnty. Sheriffs Office, G.O. 01-33, Interrogation of Suspects with Developmental
Disabilities (Nov. 17, 2001) (describing detailed policies concerning interrogation of sus-
pects with developmental disabilities, including guidelines for interrogation and post-
confession analysis) (on file with author). For an analysis of interrogation policies across the
state of Virginia, see Brandon L. Garrett, Interrogation Policies, 49 U. Rich, L. Rev. 8-13
(forthcoming 2015).
115 Gregory DeClue, Inside Information Checklist (on file with author).
116 See Garrett, Convicting the Innocent, supra note 1, at 28; supra note 84 and accompa-
nying text.
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ask open-ended questions about what happened during the commission
of the crime, could also safeguard interrogations against contamination.
In addition, policies should, as recommended by the Inbau and Reid
Treatise, ensure that key details concerning the crime not be made pub-
lic, and be documented in the casefile, so that witnesses are not contam-
inated through public disclosure of those key facts. 17
C. Pretrial Judicial Review
Judges are understandably highly reluctant to exclude confession evi-
dence at trial, since the result may practically dispose of the prosecu-
tion's case. Nevertheless, the judicial review currently conducted is dis-
connected with the scientific research on confessions. I have described
elsewhere how judges ruled in DNA exoneree cases where these confes-
sions, which we now know to have been false, were voluntarily given,
despite the typical length of the interrogations, the often coercive tech-
niques used, and the youth and intellectual disability of many of the de-
fendants."' Particularly striking in the recent set of DNA exonerations
was the ruling by the trial judge in the death penalty cases of Henry
McCollum and Leon Brown that the statements were voluntary because
"neither officer made any threat or show of violence and made no act
which suggested violence" and where they had claimed that the "an-
swers of the defendant and each of them as given to the respective offic-
ers were not incoherent and were sensible."ll 9 Despite their documented
intellectual disability, despite the many hours of questioning and their
young ages, despite the fact that they claimed not to have read or under-
stood the confession statements, and despite no recording of any of the
interrogation, the confession was readily admitted and provided the sole
evidence of guilt to support their death sentences.1 2 0
Scientific research on false confessions could better inform the volun-
tariness analysis under the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process
Clause. The voluntariness analysis remains poorly defined; courts weigh
a totality of the circumstances, using a range of factors without clear
117 See sources cited supra note 69.
118 See Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, supra note 1, at 1107-09.
119 McCollum and Brown Trial Transcript, supra note 77, at 1348-50.
120 For an appellate opinion affirming, see State v. McCollum, 433 S.E.2d 144, 160 (N.C.
1993) (finding trial court's conclusions regarding voluntariness of the confession "amply
supported by substantial evidence"), and State v. Brown, 436 S.E.2d 163, 166-68 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1993).
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weights. The Supreme Court, for example, has not clarified whether in-
terrogations lasting more than a few hours are inherently coercive,
which is the view of police trainers; the Supreme Court has only held
that a thirty-six-hour interrogation was inherently coercive, but without
suggesting a lower bound. 12 1 Professor Eve Brensike Primus has pro-
posed that more rule-like approaches to such questions be incorporated
into the existing voluntariness caselaw, to add clearer guidance to the
doctrine.1 22
While reliability is not a separate ground for excluding a confession
under the U.S. Constitution, following Colorado v. Connelly,1 23 evidence
of suggestion and contamination of a confession can inform the volun-
tariness analysis as a factor. After all, an individual who will parrot back
facts fed during an interrogation is highly likely to have had his will
overborne during the process. The Ninth Circuit recently embraced such
analysis in an en banc ruling, highlighting how pressure "placed on [the
defendant] to adopt certain responses" and "suggestive questioning that
provided details of the alleged crime" provided evidence of involuntari-
ness,124 as have other prominent courts, such as the New York Court of
Appeals.1 25 The Supreme Court has suggested that intellectually disabled
persons are more suggestible and likely to give false confessions; as the
Court put it recently in Hall v. Florida, such persons "face 'a special risk
of wrongful execution' because they are more likely to give false con-
fessions, are often poor witnesses, and are less able to give meaningful
assistance to their counsel."1 26
121 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153 (1944).
122 Primus, supra note 8, at 2.
123 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).
124 United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008, 1028 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
125 Warney v. State, 16 N.Y.3d 428, 436 (N.Y. 2011) (describing how in a civil wrongful
conviction case "[t]he allegations describe how no member of the public other than the per-
petrator could have known all the details contained in the confession-whether negligently
or through intentional manipulation, police misconduct led to the inclusion of these details in
Warney's statement").
126 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1993 (2014) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320-21
(2002)). The Court in Atkins noted:
Despite the heavy burden that the prosecution must shoulder in capital cases, we can-
not ignore the fact that in recent years a disturbing number of inmates on death row
have been exonerated. These exonerations have included at least one mentally retard-
ed person who unwittingly confessed to a crime that he did not commit.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320 n.25.
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A separate constitutional source for reliability review is the Court's
ruling in cases such as Napue v. Illinois that it violates due process for
the State to present fabricated witness testimony.1 27 While Napue claims
of fabrication are litigated postconviction,1 28 and they have been used in
civil wrongful conviction litigation in which confession contamination
can be proven,12 9 courts have not examined the potential for fabrication
in a given case pretrial. My proposal is that courts could ask pretrial
whether it is possible that a confession was contaminated by suggestive
questioning, including by reviewing records of the interrogation, to
safeguard against fabrication of evidence. Any concealed evidence con-
cerning the contamination of a confession could also violate Brady v.
Maryland and provide further due process support for a pretrial inquiry
into reliability, although as with Napue, courts have typically examined
such claims only postconviction.130
Pretrial judicial review can and should focus on not only whether in-
terrogations are unduly coercive, but also on their reliability. Not only
do constitutional sources support such review, but federal and state law
reliability standards can and should be interpreted to incorporate scien-
tific research that can inform the analysis of the reliability of confession
statements.' ' Such evidence rules may be particularly well suited to in-
corporating concerns regarding reliability. In cases in which a judge
finds a confession to be admissible, judges should turn to the questions
whether to permit expert evidence concerning that evidence, and how to
best inform the jury concerning the relevant scientific evidence.
127 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
128 See, e.g., Lisker v. Knowles, 651 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1140 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (reversing
conviction in part and granting relief on Napue claim).
129 See Jerry Markon, Wrongfully Jailed Man Wins Suit, Wash. Post, May 6, 2006, at B01
(describing multimillion dollar civil rights verdict regarding Napue claim in false confession
case .
I3 I have previously developed a theory of how and when courts could conduct such re-
view pretrial. Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 Calif L. Rev. 383, 385
(2007).
1' For an example of a state court using scientific research to inform reliability standards
in the area of eyewitness identification evidence, see State v. Lawson, 244 P.3d 860, 872-73
(Or. Ct. App. 2010). For an excellent in-depth discussion proposing such reliability review
under state evidence rules, see Leo et al., supra note 9, at 834.
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D. Expert Evidence
Although confessions have a great impact on mock-juror decisions,13 2
there is some evidence that those prior statements can be countered and
that jurors can be sensitized to the research on confessions, including
through expert evidence. 13 3 Few exonerees had experts testify at trial
concerning their confessions. Only three of the first forty exonerees had
experts and five of the more recent twenty-six exonerees had experts.1 34
Many of these exonerees were juveniles or intellectually disabled and
particularly susceptible to suggestion by the authorities. Yet the jury
never had that explained to them. State and federal courts have been di-
vided, at least in published appellate rulings, on whether expert testimo-
ny on false confessions can be admitted. Many of those rulings are
themselves inconsistent in a way that does not reflect a sound or con-
sistent scientific framework that could guide lower courts. Some appel-
late courts find such expert testimony admissible.' Some appellate
courts rule that confession-related expert testimony would not assist the
jury, since it is within the commonsense of laypersons.'3 1 Others find the
scientific research itself not sufficiently established.'3 7 Other courts have
demanded that such evidence evaluate the particular defendant in ques-
tion,"' while still other courts forbid direct evaluation of the defendant's
132 See Kassin, supra note 52, at 433-34; see also Linda A. Henkel, Jurors' Reactions to
Recanted Confessions: Do the Defendant's Personal and Dispositional Characteristics Play a
Role? 14 Psychol. Crime & L. 565, 567 (2008) (explaining the impact of coerced confes-
sions on mock juries and conviction rates).
133 See Iris Blandon-Gitlin, Katheryn Sperry & Richard A. Leo, Jurors Believe Interroga-
tion Tactics Are Not Likely to Elicit False Confessions: Will Expert Witness Testimony In-
form Them Otherwise?, 2010 Psychol. Crime & L. Online 1, 17-19; Costanzo et al., supra
note 94, at 242. This is an area in which more research should be done, particularly on
whether expert testimony assists juror discriminability.
134 See Garrett, Convicting the Innocent, supra note 1, at 40. The recent cases are those of
Leon Brown, Curtis Jasper Moore, Jamie Lee Peterson, Frank Sterling, and Damon
Thibodeaux. At least three DNA exonerees, Travis Hayes, David Allen Jones, and Douglas
Warney had requests for false confession experts denied by the trial judge.
135 See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1341-46 (7th Cir. 1996); Boyer v. State,
825 So. 2d 418, 419-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d 763, 770-74
(Ind. 2002).
136 See, e.g., People v. Son, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871, 883 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); People v.
Gilliam, 670 N.E.2d 606, 619-20 (Ill. 1996); Commonwealth v. Alicia, 92 A.3d 753, 764
(Pa. 2014) (finding proposed false confession testimony "constitutes an impermissible inva-
sion of the jury's role as the exclusive arbiter of credibility").
137 See, e.g., Riley v. State, 604 S.E.2d 488, 495 (Ga. 2004).
'3 See, e.g., State v. King, 904 A.2d 808, 818-22 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006); State
v. Free, 798 A.2d 83, 95-96 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
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suggestibility and compliance while permitting the jury to hear general
research on the counterintuitive causes of false confessions.139 Still more
troubling, some of the same courts that exclude defense expert testimony
nevertheless permit law enforcement officers to testify based on their
special expertise that the defendant exhibited indicia of deception during
the interrogation. 14 0 Moreover, courts have long routinely permitted
mental health experts to opine on other important matters, such as a de-
fendant's competency to stand trial or a defense of diminished capaci-
141*ty; failing to provide an indigent defendant with an expert psychiatrist
regarding an insanity defense can violate the due process rights of the
defendant. 142 Despite inconsistent appellate caselaw on confession-
related experts, trial court rulings may present a somewhat different pic-
ture. It is unknown how often trial courts refuse to find or rule inadmis-
sible expert testimony on false confessions, and conversely how often
trial courts admit such testimony routinely and without any reported
opinion.1 43
As that brief summary of the caselaw suggests, not only do courts
reason differently about what an expert can present to the jury, but there
are also multiple forms of expert testimony potentially relevant in con-
fession cases. First, experts may explain general research on false con-
fessions, including by explaining that false confessions can occur at all,
under what general circumstances, and based on what types of psycho-
logical phenomenon.
Second, experts may testify concerning factors that may contribute to
false confessions, which may include situational factors, such as the use
3 See Chojnacki et al., supra note 94, at 24-26.
140 See State v. Davis, 32 S.W.3d 603, 608-09 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); Chojnacki et al., su-
pra note 94, at 22-23.
141 See, e.g., John T. Philipsborn, Dealing with Experts on Competence to Stand Trial:
Sugestions and Approaches, Champion, Jan.-Feb. 2008, at 12, 12.
1 See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1986).
143 Richard Leo has described to me, for example, that his expert testimony on false con-
fessions has been found admissible in the overwhelming majority of the hundreds of cases in
which he was retained. However, an appeal resulting in a written opinion would typically
only occur where the testimony was excluded, the defendant was convicted, and the defense
seeks a new trial, all of which skews reported decisions towards those in which the expert
testimony was not admitted. For descriptions of the case law, see, e.g., Amy G. Gore, Jill
Gustafson & Janice Holben, 31A Am. Jur. 2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § 138 (2014);
Brian Cutler et al., Expert Testimony on Interrogation and False Confession, 82 UMKC L.
Rev. 589, 600 (2014); Nadia Soree, Comment, When the Innocent Speak: False Confessions,
Constitutional Safeguards, and the Role of Expert Testimony, 32 Am. J. Crim. L. 191, 238-
55 (2005).
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of certain coercive or deceptive interrogation tactics, as well as disposi-
tional factors, that is, the characteristics of the suspect.1" Certain decep-
tive tactics or false evidence ploys may contribute to false confessions;
the National Resource Council has, for example, noted the concern that
telling suspects that they failed polygraph tests may contribute to false
confessions. 145 The duration of the interrogation is itself a factor, as not-
ed. Sleep deprivation, relatedly, can be a factor in impairing function-
ing.1 46 And that type of testimony may include description of general re-
search concerning the vulnerability of certain types of individuals to
pressure in interrogation situations, including research on juvenilesl4 7
and the intellectually disabled. 4 8 What research does not support, how-
ever, are conclusions about the frequency of false confessions; we simp-
ly do not know how often they occur, and there are not (and likely can-
not be) empirical data on rates of false confessions under particular
conditions.1 49 Researchers cannot ethically test coercive interrogation
techniques in a laboratory setting, and in actual cases there often may
not be evidence like DNA that can confirm whether the confession is
true or false.
Third, expert testimony not on general research, but on the specific
case, may take still additional forms. An expert may study the documen-
tation concerning the confession to analyze whether leading questions or
other tactics were used to disclose key facts to the suspect, thereby con-
taminating the confession, and in contrast, whether the suspect could
144 See State v. Perea, 322 P.3d 624, 638 (Utah 2013) (reversing lower court bar on expert
testimony, noting that juries "do not understand the prevalence of false confessions, the ag-
gressive and persuasive techniques employed by police to elicit confessions from suspects,
or other factors that contribute to false confessions"); Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Inter-
rogations and Confessions: A Handbook, supra note 106, at 308-31. For a ruling affirming
that threats of violence were within the jury's experience, see Brown v. Horell, 644 F.3d 969,
978, 982-83 (9th Cir. 2011).
145 Comm. to Review the Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph, Nat'l Res. Council, The
Polygraph and Lie Detection 56 (2003), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?
record id=10420&page=Rl].
146 Mark Blagrove, Effects of Length of Sleep Deprivation on Interrogative Suggestibility,
2 J. Experimental Psychol.: Applied 48, 56-57 (1996).
147 See, e.g., Jessica Owen-Kostelnik et al., Testimony and Interrogation of Minors: As-
sumptions About Maturity and Morality, 61 Am. Psychologist 286, 300-301 (2006).
See, e.g., W.M.L. Finlay & E. Lyons, Acquiescence in Interviews with People Who
Have Mental Retardation, 40 Mental Retardation 14, 25-26 (2002).
149 See United States v. Deuman, 892 F. Supp. 2d 881, 886 (W.D. Mich. 2012) (citing Ste-
ven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World,
82 N.C. L. Rev. 891, 931 (2004)).
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volunteer accurate information about the crime when given the oppor-
tunity to do so. 50 Experts may examine the defendant, and may conduct
a clinical evaluation to assess the suggestibility of an individual, and
may measure whether the individual is intellectually disabled, by using
instruments such as an IQ test. Experts may also examine an individual's
capacity to understand right from wrong and to be charged criminally at
all; such expert testimony is routine.
Testimony by detectives describing an interrogation is itself a form of
expert testimony, where detectives make claims regarding their ability to
detect deception versus truth in a suspect. Few courts have treated such
testimony as expert testimony that must be rigorously assessed for its
admissibility as such, but some courts have begun to scrutinize such tes-
timony far more carefully. For example, the Tenth Circuit recently found
it to be reversible error that the trial judge allowed a detective to testify
that as an FBI agent; he had conducted over a thousand interviews and
could detect lies.' He opined that when the suspect called "on his
faith," during the interview, that: "My training has shown me, and
more[] so my experience in all these interviews, when people start bring-
ing faith into validating .. . their statements, that they're deceptive.
Those are deceptive statements."1 5 2 As to other statements by the sus-
pect, he opined, "Never in my career have I seen that with an innocent
person." 53 The Tenth Circuit ruled that in contrast to expert testimony
resting on specialized knowledge such as scientific research, this was
improper testimony making credibility determinations.15 4 In that case,
the detective was making amplified lie-detection claims. However, de-
tectives more routinely claim the ability to detect signs of untruthfulness
in suspects, and they cite their training and experience as interrogators.
Professor Brian Gallini describes why the "Reid technique" used today
by law enforcement may create a psychological advantage for interroga-
150 See Nirider et al., supra note 7, at 859 (describing how an expert may examine this
question of "fit," and how a defense lawyer may explore such issues on cross-examination as
welY.
11 United States v. Hill, 749 F.3d 1250, 1251-52, 1265-66 (10th Cir. 2014).
112 Id. at 1251, 1257 (alteration in original).
15 Id.
154 Id. at 1267.
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tors, but lacks any validated ability to "distinguish between true and
false confessions." 55
Any law enforcement claims regarding experience or methods used to
detect lies versus truth are in the nature of expert evidence, and should
be subject to all of the gatekeeping strictures of expert testimony, such
as Daubert analysis and Federal Rule of Evidence 702.156 Moreover, if
the government introduces such testimony, that subject should at mini-
mum be properly the subject of expert evidence by the defense. For too
long the presentation of what amounts to expert testimony on interroga-
tions has been unscientific, and it has been one-sided.
E. Jury Instructions
As with other forms of scientific evidence, expert testimony may pro-
vide a far more complete description of the scientific research and its
characteristics and limitations, but where such expert testimony is not
available, or to supplement and guide such testimony, judicial instruc-
tions can also set forth relevant framework evidence for the jury.157 Un-
fortunately, traditional jury instructions concerning confession evidence
typically repeat constitutional standards and ask that the jury consider
the voluntariness of the statements; some also refer to whether the offic-
ers complied with Miranda v. Arizona.158 The Supreme Court has em-
155 Brian R. Gallini, Police "Science" in the Interrogation Room: Seventy Years of Pseudo-
Psychological Interrogation Methods to Obtain Inadmissible Confessions, 61 Hastings L.J.
529, 531 (2010).
156 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 592-94 (1993).
157 See Nat'l Research Council, supra note 14, at 27, explaining:
Expert testimony on eyewitness memory and identifications has many advantages
over jury instructions as a method to explain relevant scientific framework evidence to
the jury: (1) Expert witnesses can explain scientific research in a more flexible man-
ner, by presenting only the relevant research to the jury; (2) Expert witnesses are fa-
miliar with the research and can describe it in detail; (3) Expert witnesses can convey
the state of the research at the time of the trial; (4) Expert witnesses can be cross-
examined by the other side; and (5) Expert witnesses can more clearly describe the
limitations of the research.
The report also noted, however, that expert testimony is more costly, and that state courts
routinely deny funds to indigent defendants for expert assistants. Id.
158 See, e.g., New Jersey Model Jury Charge, Statements of Defendant 1 (June 14, 2010)
(asking "whether or not the statement was actually made by the defendant, and, if made,
whether the statement or any portion of it is credible" and noting that the court should "dis-
cuss any proof adduced before the jury which went to defendant's Miranda rights or the
statement's voluntariness"). To provide another example, the Washington State Pattern In-
structions largely just ask that the jury find that the defendant was properly advised of the
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phasized that a pretrial voluntariness hearing before a judge, using a
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, is sufficient, citing to
"the normal rule that the admissibility of evidence is a question for the
court rather than the jury."1 5 9 In addition, federal courts, following 18
U.S.C. § 3501(a), instruct the jury simply to "give such weight to the
confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances." 60 In
contrast, few state courts provide information to the jury regarding how
to assess voluntariness, nor do they instruct the jury to examine the reli-
ability of the statement or provide information concerning what can
cause false confessions, or conversely, what are indicia of a reliable con-
fession. 16 1
Miranda rights and voluntarily waived them, and then provide the following general guid-
ance: "You may give such weight and credibility to any alleged out-of-court statements of
the defendant as you see fit, taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances." Wash.
State Supreme Court Comm. on Jury Instructions, Washington Pattern Jury Instructions-
Criminal: WPIC6.41 Out of Court Statements by Defendant 1 (3d ed. 2008), available at
https://govt.westlaw.com/wcrji/Document/Ief9e3bc7elOd ldaadelae871d9b2cbe?viewType
=FullText&originationContext-documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageltem&contextD
ata=(sc.Default).
159 Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 490 (1972); see also id. ("We are not disposed to im-
pose as a constitutional requirement a procedure we have found wanting merely to afford
petitioner a second forum for litigating his claim."); id. at 486 n.14 (noting that defendant
may present such circumstances to the jury, and citing with approval 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a));
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966) (stating that the "issues presented [by confes-
sions] are of constitutional dimensions and must be determined by the courts"). 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501 (2012) provides:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of
Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in ev-
idence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the
trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntari-
ness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be
admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence
on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the con-
fession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances.
160 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (2012); see, e.g., The Comm. on Fed. Criminal Jury Instructions
for the Seventh Circuit, Pattern Federal Criminal Jury Instructions for the Seventh Circuit
§ 3.02, available at https://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Pattem Jury Instr/pjury.pdf; U.S. Courts
for the Ninth Circuit, Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions § 4.1, available at
htt://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury-instructions/node/355.
6 For examples of states that do provide somewhat expanded instructions regarding volun-
tariness, see, e.g., N.H. Bar Ass'n Criminal Jury Instructions Drafting Comm., Draft Model
Criminal Jury Instructions, Confessions or Admissions 14, available at http://www.nhbar.org/
uploads/pdf/CJI-14.pdf; New York Model Criminal Jury Instructions, Statements (Admission,
Confessions), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/1-General/CJI2d.Confession.pdf
(providing an "expanded charge on traditional voluntariness").
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Compare the types of instructions that an increasing number of juris-
dictions now provide to situate eyewitness evidence in a scientific
framework. 16 2 New Jersey now provides quite detailed instructions on
eyewitness evidence, based on the 2011 decision by its Supreme Court
in State v. Henderson'63; the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court re-
cently adopted more concise jury instructions that convey similar infor-
mation about scientific research on eyewitness memory.'6 No such
model instructions exist in the area of confession evidence, although
several jurisdictions do include cautionary jury instructions should a
statute requiring that interrogations be recorded not be complied with.16 1
Bar committees tasked with revising model jury instructions should re-
visit the question of how to phrase such instructions, and scholars should
study the helpfulness of such instructions on lay decisionmakers, who
may place particular weight on confession evidence.
Should a judge not suppress a confession-and such suppression of
confession statements is vanishingly rare-but also not permit expert
witnesses to carefully explain the relevant scientific evidence, then as a
second-best option, and at minimum, jurors should be informed of far
more than their task to examine the seeming credibility of the confession
evidence, and factors bearing on voluntariness. They must have the pro-
cess of interrogation explained and the risk factors concerning false con-
fessions detailed. They should hear any relevant evaluations of the de-
fendants' suggestibility. Unless such a framework exists, detectives will
not have appropriate incentives to conduct interrogations carefully them-
selves, using recording to document and prevent contamination, and us-
ing special procedures to assess juveniles and intellectually disabled
suspects.
F. Appellate and Postconviction Review
When a convict challenges confession evidence on appeal or postcon-
viction, as I have documented elsewhere, even in cases in which we now
162 See Nat'l Research Council, supra note 14, at 21-30.
1' 27 A.3d 872, 928 (N.J. 2011).
16 Commonwealth. v. Gomes, No. SJC-1 1537, at 15-25 (Mass. Jan. 12, 2015).
165 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-4503, -4504 (2008); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 972.115(d)(2)(a) (West
2012); see also Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 534 (Mass. 2004)
("[T]he jury should also be advised that the absence of a recording permits (but does not
compel) them to conclude that the Commonwealth has failed to prove voluntariness beyond
a reasonable doubt.").
2015] 43 1
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 101:395
know the confessions to have been false, judges will typically deny re-
lief, citing to the seemingly powerful details in the confession statements
that were precisely the produce of the contamination.1 66 Making the dan-
ger of such rulings still greater, in 1991 in Arizona v. Fulminante the
Supreme Court controversially, and incorrectly in my view, opened the
door to overly deferential harmless error review of confession errors on
appeal and postconviction; statutory restrictions on federal habeas re-
view since that time, and the Court's interpretation of those statutes,
may further constrain review of central trial evidence such as confession
evidence.' 67 Courts, once aware of the scientific research concerning
false confessions and the danger of confession contamination, may be-
come more skeptical of claims that detailed confession statements that
are not the product of interrogations recorded in their entirety are neces-
sarily accurate evidence. Further, courts may become more open to re-
versing decisions by trial judges not to permit expert evidence, or find-
ing counsel ineffective for failing to develop evidence, including
scientific evidence, concerning a confession, or by reversing due to po-
lice or prosecutorial misconduct concerning the suppression of infor-
mation concerning contamination of confession statements.' 68 The Sixth
166 See Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, supra note 1, at 1107-09 (describing
how courts often cited to the "overwhelming" nature of the evidence, particularly the "fully
corroborative" facts that they had allegedly confessed to); see also Garrett, Convicting the
Innocent, supra note 1, at 185-86 (noting that of twenty-two innocent people who falsely
confessed and had written decisions on appeal or postconviction, only seven raised Fifth
Amendment claims and three more raised Miranda claims, but none were successful; one
exoneree received a reversal on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim relating to the con-
fession evidence, but also failed to challenge a range of other evidence at trial). Only one of
these sixty-three DNA exonerees, Curtis Jasper Moore, had a federal judge reviewing his
habeas petition grant postconviction relief on a confession-related claim. Moore v. Ballone,
488 F. Supp. 798, 807-08 (E.D. Va. 1980).
16 499 U.S. 279, 284-85 (1991). The Court's ruling in Arizona v. Fulminante has been
much criticized elsewhere. See, e.g. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Comment, Arizona v. Fulminan-
te: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 152,
165-67 (1991). I would add to those criticisms my own evidence concerning judicial will-
ingness to cite to apparent "overwhelming" evidence of guilt when finding confession-
related errors harmless. The enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 has only made such review more deferential during federal habeas corpus proceed-
ings, as have subsequent Supreme Court rulings, such as Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct.
1388, 1398-99 (2011), cabining the scope of factual development in federal habeas courts.
Thus, even revisiting Fulminante would not be enough to provide sufficiently searching re-
view, and nor will such review focus on the appropriate questions unless the Court revisits
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).
168 Compare People v. Oliveras, 90 A.D.3d 563, 563-64 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (reversing
conviction where "defense counsel failed to take any steps whatsoever to obtain defendant's
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Circuit recently noted, in the context of a postconviction Brady claim,
that the State's theory of the case was already weak, since there may be
"good reason to question the legitimacy" of a confession statement that
was largely unrecorded (the detectives were "turning off the tape record-
er periodically throughout the questioning") and allegedly given by a
suggestible person; as a result, it was "exceedingly difficult to determine
what information [the defendant] offered organically and what was 'con-
taminated' by the detectives."l6 9
CONCLUSION
In Escobedo v. Illinois, the U.S. Supreme Court explained:
We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modem, that a
system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the
"confession" will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to
abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence inde-
pendently secured through skillful investigation.1 7 0
Despite those words in its 1964 ruling, and the Court's subsequent rul-
ing in Miranda v. Arizona, citing to the case of George Whitmore, a
suggestible man who falsely confessed in New York due to "brain-
washing, hypnosis, fright," it is not at all clear that judges have learned
those lessons, nor taken account of new techniques that can more accu-
rately document the confessions themselves. 17 1 Instead, over the past
several decades since Miranda was decided, the Court has endeavored to
not only weaken the Miranda rule at nearly every turn, but also to re-
move concerns of reliability from the voluntariness analysis in rulings
like Colorado v. Connelly.172 In recent rulings like that in Salinas v. Tex-
relevant psychiatric and educational records, or to consult with an expert psychiatrist or psy-
chologist in support of the defense"), and Ex parte Villegas, 415 S.W.3d 885, 887 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013), with Simmons v. State, 105 So. 3d 475, 493 (Fla. 2012) ("[E]ven if [false
confessions expert] had been presented at trial to testify that the circumstances of the inter-
rogation could lead to a false confession, such would not have significantly diminished the
incriminating effect of the other evidence.").
169 Bies v. Sheldon, 775 F.3d 386, 402-04 (6th Cir. 2014).
170 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964) (footnotes omitted).
17' 384 U.S. 436, 455 n.24 (1966); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
172 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986); see also Garrett, The Substance of
False Confessions, supra note 1, at 1109-12 (discussing Connelly and the Supreme Court's
turn away from reliability review).
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as,1 73 the Court permitted if not outright encouraged police to take ad-
vantage of informal, undocumented, and noncustodial questioning.1 74
Confessions have become far less regulated at the federal level at a time
when we know far more about what can cause false confessions. 75
The Supreme Court and lower court judges tasked with reviewing
confessions both pretrial and postconviction should be still more chas-
tened by the cases of Henry McCollum and Leon Brown, both of whom
had their convictions affirmed at every level for decades before DNA ul-
timately proved their innocence. When Supreme Court Justice Harry
Blackmun famously wrote in a dissent in 1994, "From this day forward,
I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death," 7 6 Justice Antonin
Scalia responded: "[What about] the case of the 11-year-old girl raped
by four men and then killed by stuffing her panties down her throat....
How enviable a quiet death by lethal injection compared with that!""'
To be sure, when McCollum's case reached the Supreme Court, Justice
Blackmun dissented from the denial of certiorari in the case, and insisted
that although the crime was "abhorrent," there was "more to the story."
After all, McCollum had "an IQ between 60 and 69 and the mental age
of a 9-year-old. He reads on a second-grade level." Justice Blackmun
wrote, "This factor alone persuades me that the death penalty in his case
is unconstitutional."' 7 Never before had North Carolina jurors imposed
the death penalty on a young man under the age of twenty. 179 Never be-
fore had they imposed the death penalty on a man "whom they had
found mentally retarded."'" As described, in 2014, DNA tests were
done on the evidence in the case. Police had said for years that it was all
17 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2177-79 (2013).
174 Brandon L. Garrett, Remaining Silent After Salinas, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. Dialogue 116,
116 (2013). For scholarship concerning the "erosion" of Miranda, see, e.g., Barry Friedman,
The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 Geo.
L.J. 1 (2010); Yale Kamisar, The Rise, Decline, and Fall (?) of Miranda, 87 Wash. L. Rev.
965 (2012); Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 Calif. L. Rev. 1519 (2008).
17 One exception to this trend was the Court's important recognition that juvenile suspects
are especially vulnerable during police questioning in JD.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct.
2394, 2408 (2011); the Court had earlier rejected the view that age was a required considera-
tion in the Miranda analysis, Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 668 (2004).
176 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1 Id. at 1143 (Scalia, J., concurring).
McCollum v. North Carolina, 512 U.S. 1254, 1255 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
179 Id. at 1256.
180 Id.; see also State v. McCollum, 433 S.E.2d 144, 167-68 (N.C. 1993) (Exum, C.J., dis-
senting) (explaining the rarity of capital cases involving mentally retarded defendants).
434 [Vol. 101:395
Contaminated Confessions Revisited
lost, but in fact, for decades, the box with the evidence sat in storage.
The North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission, a government body
whose job it is to investigate potential wrongful convictions, finally lo-
cated the evidence and ordered the DNA tests. McCollum's sister had
sent them a letter asking for their help in her brother's case. The results
cleared McCollum and Brown and implicated a man who had committed
a similar rape and murder in 1984 and who lived next door to the field
where the crime was committed.'"' If even this poster-child case for the
death penalty could be completely wrong, then far more care is warrant-
ed in accepting undocumented confession evidence as true.
Due to cases like McCollum's, and the others described in this Essay,
far more is changing on the ground, even if constitutional criminal pro-
cedure remains fairly static. Voluntariness analysis can take better ac-
count of the suggestibility of defendants and the potential unreliability of
confession statements. Increasingly, courts now recognize that "whether
negligently or through intentional manipulation," police can cause "the
inclusion of these details" in a confession statement.182 Confession evi-
dence is also increasingly informed by scientific research that explains
why false confessions like those by DNA exonerees can happen, and
that can help in reviewing evidence from interrogations better in the fu-
ture." That scientific research is slowly leading to real improvements in
police practices.
As described in this Essay, not only did sixty-two of sixty-six ex-
onerees who falsely confessed have their confessions contaminated by
seemingly accurate crime scene details, but a total of nineteen of the
group of sixty-six exonerees had DNA test results exclude them at the
time of trial. If false confessions may lead to convictions even in cases
in which DNA excludes the defendant, then the problem is far greater-
and more worrisome-in the vast majority of cases in which there is
181 Joseph Neff, Judge Overturns Convictions of Robeson Men in Child's 1983 Rape,
Murder, News & Observer (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.newsobserver.com/2014/09/
02/4115955/robeson-men-innocent-of-childs.html.
182 Warney v. State, 16 N.Y.3d 428, 436 (2011).
183 Garrett, Convicting the Innocent, supra note 1, at 248 (describing how eleven states and
the District of Columbia require electronic recording of at least some interrogations, and
seven more state supreme courts either require or encourage recording of interrogations; in
addition, many hundreds of police departments record interrogations); see also State v.
Lockhart, 4 A.3d 1176, 1206 (Conn. 2010) ("The value in recording interrogations is so ob-
vious as to require little discussion."); Taslitz, supra note 8, at 426 (2012) (noting how states
are looking at stricter reliability standards for confessions).
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simply no evidence to perform a DNA test upon. We will continue to re-
visit the problem of confession contamination, including in high-profile
exonerations, until a scientific framework is put firmly in place to im-
prove interrogations, evaluate their reliability at trial, inform the jury,
guide appellate and postconviction courts, and most fundamentally, to
safeguard the reliability of interrogations and confessions.
2015] Contaminated Confessions Revisited 437
APPENDIX: CHARACTERISTICS OF DNA EXONEREE FALSE CONFESSIONS1 84
e StteJ / as Non-Public Facts, CoMborated Facts, Documented?
Et Jand Inconsistendesu
* None: no details. He reportedly stated: "I am
responsible. I just don't remember how."
* Avery testified that he "didn't hurt that woman Signed
Avery, William WI and I don't know who had hurt that woman." statement
* And they were "trying to ask me give him some
details to that murder, where that woman's
clothes was..."
* Went with Rufin and Dixon to lady's house to
get money, they forced way in through front
Bivens, Philip NIS door Vd
* Says victim was r Video
* "I seen Bobby Ray, I mean Larry cut her throat"
using a long knife or butcher knife
* Victim was hit with a brick- then changed in the
statements to a piece of concrete
* Victim was kicked
Bradford, BUT Signed
Marcellius 1 J * Testified victim found inside car when found statement
outside.
* Did not initially name Saunders, then did at trial;
also named other persons never located
* Rape was between 9 and 10 am on date of crime.
* Entered through basement window
* Victim was short, had light-colored hair, not fully
clothed
* Assault in area downstairs, not a room
* Victim was turned away fiom attacker during
Bradford, Ted WA assault, cuffed behind back, and nylon stocking Audio
covered culprit's face
BUT
* Inconsistencies included that he entered through
window on the east side of house
* ilat no one else was in the house (there was a
baby)
184 This Appendix updates data presented in Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent:
Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong 14-44 (2011), and Brandon L. Garrett, The Sub-
stance of False Confessions, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1051, passim (2010) and made available online
at http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/librarysite/garrett falseconfess.htm.
J indicates a juvenile at the time of arrest. ID indicates intellectually disabled and MI
indicates mentally ill. Still others may not have been adequately examined by experts or ful-
ly diagnosed at the time of trial.
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Exo m State J as Non-Public Facts, Corwborated Facts, DExonree tat J/I/MIand Inconsistendies
* Victim was wearing dark blue jeans or slacks
* Victim was watching television on her couch
* Couch was tan/beige/brown
* Rapist grabbed victim's left arm
Brown, Dennis LA * Facts about style/interior of home
BUT
* Stated entered through window when attacker
entered through the door
* Brown had a learning disability
* Two page confession statement described
entering the front door of a "big two story white
house," the address ofthe house, and two "old
ladies" present
* Describing taking a black change purse.
* But in his own statement, he did not describe a
Brown, Keith NC rape, rather hitting the women and running away
* A longer set ofnotes prepared by police included
very different and apparently more accurate
details, including entering the rear ofthe house,
assaulting a woman with a hammer and a
wooden chair, and raping her and an 8 year-old
girl
* Victim was raped, vaginally and anally
* Victim was choked with a stick and with her
panties balled up in a knot in her mouth
(consistent with what medical examiner found)
* Victim left in ditch near woods and across bean
field
* Victim's clothes had been balled up and thrown Signed
Brown, Lon NC J, ID into the woods statement
BUT
* Excluded by fingerprints found on beer cans.
* No evidence linked the two others who,
according to the statement, were named as part
of the group and raped and asphyxiated the
victim
* Victim had an English accent
* Victim hit over the head with a chair, strangled
with wire, stabbed with a steak knife
Camvella, * Victim's clothes partially pulled off with her bra
FL ID, J pulked up above breasts Audio
Anthony BUT
* Said hit victim over head with Pepsi bottle when
she was raped, strangled, and stabbed
* Called victim a "girl." but she was 58 yrs. old
438
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Eoneze State jnm1 18 5  Non-Public Facts, Cortoborated Fads, Docunted?Exon e Stte J ID MI'and Iconsistencies
* Victim's nose was broken (in taped confession)
In statement Cruz gave describing a "vision":
Cruz, Rolando IL * The victim's head was bashed from behind Audio
* The victim's head formed an imprint in the mud
* The victim had been raped anally
* Described layout ofvictim's apartment
* Described rape and strangulation of victim
* Described hearing a sound like a bone breaking,
and autopsy concluded that the victim's left arm
was broken
BUT
Dean, James NE * Inconsistent descriptions of Joseph White and
described memory problems and inability to
recall details before speaking to law enforcement
* No records of mental evaluation at time of
interrogations or trial obtained, but at trial
described difficulty distinguishing between
dreams and reality
* Gatorade bottle used to hit victim
* Locations of "three distinct crime scenes"
Deskovic, Jeffrey NY 1 * Victim was carrying a camera and knew the Audio
location where it was found
* Victim received blow to the head
* The victim was dragged and her bra ripped off
* Three culprits knocked on door, victim came to
door, one went behind the house through back
door and let the other two in
* Victim raped by other two culprits
*One cut her across the throat and the other cut her
on the stomach
* Took officers to shack where the culprits
allegedly went after murder and found a pair of
pants and a sweatshirt in a plastic bag
Dixon, Bobby BUT Video
Ray * Testified that he testified differently on different
occasions concerning the details, including who
cut the victim's throat.
* He testified at Ruffin's trial that was forced to
confess: "To tell you the trith, you said that I
was there and which you wouldn't let me bring
the word out"
* And "my mind comes and goes, and I don't like
to see nobody took away for nothing they ain't
done."
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 101:395
ateJ/IDIMI 5  Non-Public Facts, Cormborated Facts,
and Inconsistencies
* Victim beaten to death at his store
* Over $1,000 was taken fam store, in bag with
checks and receipts
* Victim beaten with 3.5 foot long mahogany/oak
stick
* During struggle, threw stick out the car window Si
* Victim's car taken, it bmke down, and it was left ign
in Chicago VideoBUT
* No black bag described found at scene
* Said he used gloves or socks to cover fingers
during robbery, but fingerprints not matching
Edwards found at scene
* No evidence victim had left keys in front door
irst victim
* Wearing a tampon, which her attacker removed
and threw on the floor ofher mom.
* Had a bedside lamp on
* Reading a magazine before being assaulted
* Attacker entered through a window
* Victim was a brunette
BUT
Godschalk, Bruce PA initially said he entered through a kitchen Audio
window; the apartment had no kitchen window
Second victim
* Assaulted in her bedroom
* A pillow from victim's don's bedroom was used
during attack
* Victim was blonde
* Rape occured on the floor
* Attacker fled after victim said someone was
retuning home
* Based on court file, new reports and
conversations with Gray's lawyers and former
prosecutors involved in the case, Gray "had
given a detailed confession." Attomey
Grievance Comm'n v. Kent, 653 A.2d 909,917
(Md. 1995).
* He had reportedly offered details including a
description ofhow and where the murder took
Gray, Anthony MD ID place while he stood watch
* His statements also reportedly contained certain
inconsistencies with crime scene evidence. See
Todd Richissin, Trying to Right an Injustice;
Munder A Defense Attorney and Calvert
County State's Attorney Say a Man Has Been
Wrongly Imprisoned for the Past Seven Years,
Baltimore Sun, Feb. 6,1999, lA.
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Exonere State JNon-Public Facts, Cormborated Facts, Documented?and Inconsistencies
* Location of crime scene
* Where cars were parked
* There were two victims
*One victim was kept at the bottom of the stairs in
Gray, Paula U ID the abandoned house
* The second victim was shot twice in the head
from a very close range
* The first victim was taken to a field and shot
twice in the head and once in the back
* Two children were killed
* Panties placed in one victim's mouth
* Nails and blue cloth hammered into one victim's Signed
Halsey, Byron NJ ID/MI head with a brick staten
* Scissors used in assault
* Red wire used in assault
* Semen in one victim's mouth
* Victim was a white woman
* Victim was forced into her car
* Victim had infant car seat in back seat
* Told victim not to look and raped victim
* Implied he had a gun
Hatchett, * Told victim it was her "lucky day" Audio
Nathaniel * Left victim on service drive near expressway
* Described victim's pubic hair
BUT
* Denied taking victim's purse or contents, whereas
victim described assailant taking contents of
purse
S*None. He reportedly agreed he was present as a
Hayes, Travis LA J, ID getaway dver Audio
* He and his accomplices drove to the scene in a
dark green, late model Fori
* Abducted girl's lip was bleeding
* Victim was blindfolded, hit with a bat and kicked
on head
* Victim was dragged on ground
Hemnandez, BUT
Alejandro L J * Gave inconect description of a light and
described an appliance being stolen from the
house when nothing had been stolen
* Apparently at first trial, a transcript of which was
not obtained, a defense expert conducted an
examination and found that he was "dull-
nomal"
* Location of one crime
Jones, David UT
CA ID * He denied taking one victim's clothes off Audio
Allen describes giving that victim money, and being
taken to location by the victim
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Exonevee State J/ID/Nfl. Non-Pub Facts Conoborated Facts, Dcumented?Exonrve tateJ/IDMI^and Inconsistencies
* Location of crime scene in abandoned hotel
* Location ofblood stains
* Victim was stabbed Signed
Jones, Ronald IL * Described victim's appearance st tBUT
* He claimed victim was a prostitute who had
propositioned him and pulled a knife on him
* Dmve car and van to victim's house, in group
armed with two guns
Kagonyera, * Four people were inside, including a two men, a Signed
NC girl, and an old manKeinneth * Shotgun was fired
BUT
* DNA did not match any ofthe defendants
* Provided "somewhat detailed account of the
murder"
* Admitted presence at Dinger's Caf6'Bar with
victim shortly before her death
* Drive with victim to landfill
* Hit victim with a plank
Kelly, William PA ID * Dragged victim to location (which he identified)
where body was found, and covered body
* Confessed to raping victim vaginally
BUT
* He told police he did not ejaculate (in fact
perpetrator did ejaculate)
* Description ofvictim
* Description of victim's death by strangling;
autopsy confirmed that victim had been killed by
a ligature tightened around her throat
* Location ofbody, which had been hidden in the
corner of a cemetery
Kogut, John NY * Location of victim's ring, pendant, and cracked Video
heart locket
* Color ofpants, jacket, blankets found at crime
scene
BUT
* Stated jewehy was removed fiom crime scene,
which was not accurate
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Non-Public Facts, Corroborated Facts, D d?Exonerve State J/D/M~tasand InconsistenciesDouetd
* Victim received head wound not visible to naked
eye but uncovered during autopsy
* Victim killed with entire bottle ofpills in her
mouth, and pill bottle placed in her hand
* Victim was raped
* Victim was wearing only a bra
* White rag found in victim's hand
Laughman, Bany PA ID * Number and brand of cigarette butts found at the Audio
scene
*Blue cloth bag and shoe box with money inside
* Described victim's house
BUT
* Initially described seeing the deceased victim
through her window, which was impossible
especially because there was no light in the room
* Described murder victim's living room, including
lighting, wood panels, table and door
* Describes weapon as a tapered metallic object,
then tre iron or ablunt object (blood and hairs
were found on a tie iron found in bushes in front
ofvictim's apartment building)
* Victim did not physically resist or scream
LInscott, Stven ILe Described attacking motions consistent with AuoLinscottSteven Lblood stainsAui
* Described the victim receiving seven blows to the
head and other blows on her body (consistent
with autopsy)
BUT
* Statement described a "dream" which incorrectly
described the race of the victim, the location of
the body, and did not describe stab wounds
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 101:395
Exoneree State J/ID/MI r',o No FactsCorbortedFads, Documented?
and Inconsisencies
* Descibed the victim having been sodomized
wvith a bottle
* Green color of the bottle
* Described strangulation of victim using a ligature,
including how he grabbed her throat, consistent
with finger marks
* Described pushing up victim's sweater and bm
* Described "her clean Gloria Vanderbilt jeans."
* Described victim's gold colored earrings
* Described victim's underwear left on a tree at the
crime scene
Lloyd, Eddie Joe * Described leaving victim laying on her side Audio
* Diagram of crime scene
* Described street light on wooden telephone pole
near garage where crime occuned
BUT
* Lloyd, committed in a mental institution, had
written letters to police regarding a host of
crimes
* Lloyd described this rape occurring in a stolen
car, and the license plates matched an inoperable
and different vehicle
* He incorrectly identified the location ofthe body
on the diagmm of the crime scene
* The victim's house was on the comer ofthe street
* The house was white
* Entry took place in the rear ofthe home
* The screen door was tom and the latch flipped for
entry
* A kitchen knife was used, the victim was struck
Loweiy, Edie KS with a knife handle
I The victim's gown was pulled off
* The victim's fice was covered with a pillow
BUT
* Stated that the knife was thmwn down after the
rape, when although a knife was found at the
victim's home, it was detennined not to have
been the murder weapon
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as Non-Public Facts, Corrborated Facts, Documented?
and Iconsistencies
* Met victim at little red house near ballpark
* Culprits brought six-pack of Bull Malt Liquor
Schlitz, sixteen-ounce cans to murder scene and
drank them
* Took victim across bean field
* Picked up six-foot-long board (found with blood
stains on it)
* Victim naked laying on board
* Victim choked with own panties on a stick
(consistent with what medical examiner found)
McCollum, and he reportedly "got up and demonstrated" SignedNC ID how this was done
Henry Lee * Victim cut with knife statement
* Body dragged in bean field
* Victim's white blouse had "a little flower on it"
*Two culprits smoked Newport cigarettes
* Marked location of the rape and murder on a map
BUT
* Excluded by fingerprints found on beer cans
* No evidence linked the two others who,
according to the statement, were named as part
ofthe group that raped and asphyxiated the
victm
* Described female jogger
* Described her clothes being ripped off
*Describedjogger being hit with a pipe
* Described location of attack as "by the reservoir"
* Described rape
* Described in detail other attacks in the park that
night, including of a male jogger
Mc~ry, AtronNY i BUTVieMcCray,At Inconsistencies included the location of the crime; Video
in the video statement, he had stated, "We was at
the tennis courts and then we seen this lady
jogging lady," but those tennis courts were many
blocks from that area
* He also described the victim wearing "blue
shorts," when she was wearing long black
running tights
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Exoneree State J/IDNU 5  Non-Public Facts, Cormborated Facts,
and Inconstenes
* Victim was attacked in her kitchen
* Victim was wearing a nightgown and robe
* Described victim's bedroom accurately,
including location in the house, that it included a
night stand with a lamp, and a religious pictum
over the bed
* Second victim killed in fiont bedroom
* Second victim's electricity had been cut off
* Second victim wearing a nightgown
* Perpetrtor tore his clothes during the attack and
Miller, Robert OK left a piece of his undewear behind Video
* Second victim raped more than once on bed,
covered with sheets
* Second victim's hair was pulled
* Perpetrmtor wiped his bloody hands on her bed
sheets
* Described the positions in which the bodies were
found
BUT
* Among other inconsistencies, described stabbing
both victims, and neither was stabbed
* Victim wore dark coat when walking on the
street the night of the murder
* Victim was elderly woman, described weight,
height
* Victim was assaulted on a "big rug, carpef' that
had been removed and sent to the lab at the time
Moore, Curtis the defendant was taken to the crime scene and Audio
Jp VA ID, MI indicated area in which attack took place
* Victim choked
BUT
* Also testified that victim was eighteen or nineteen
years old
* Unclear on rape of victim. Said "got some" but
did not describe a rape
* Victim was shot one time in the "back of the left
side of her head"
* Victim was shot while kneeling on her knees
* Victim's hands were tied behind her back with
her bm and her ankles tied together with her
blouse, her mouth gagged with her scarf
Ochoa, * The water frm the sink in the women's Audio
Christopher bathroom was left running
* That sink was clogged with aprons
* The restaurant had been wiped down to prevent
leaving any fingerprint evidence
UT
*He incorrectly described the gun used and how
he gained entry to the restaurant
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Exoneree State J/ID/M"' Non-Pubhc Facts, Cormborated Facs Documented?
* The victim was raped
* The victim was killed by being smashed in the SignedOllins, Calvin I J, ID head with a piece of concrete statement
* The victim was kicked repeatedly
* None. All he could say to the police about the
Peacock, Freddie NY ID crime was"I did it I did it I raped the girl. I did
it,,
* Took $30 fiom victim's billfold and a small
candle in a glass jar
* Victim had kitchen knife dmwer that was open,
with knives including butcher knife
* Ransacked house, with lamps knocked over,
hangers knocked down in laundry room
* Victim locked in trnk of her car, while alive,
rags placed under victim's head in truck of car
* Victim's bra taken off and ripped
* Victim hit in head several times, consistent with
autopsy
* Victim sexually assaulted, vaginally and orally Audio
Peterson, Jamie * Victim's left anm scratched &
Lee* The time ofthe munier Signed
BUT statement
* As the audio taped portions of the interrogation
showed, many of these facts were told to him by
the officers in leading questions during the
intenogations
* A second perpetator was not mentioned in the
first intenogation, but only later after police
received DNA test results excluding the
defendant
* When facts were volunteered, many were
inconect, such as that the sexual assault did not
occur in the bedroom as he had stated
* Location of the murder
* Victim's injuries
* Describes the shovel
IL J * Clothing placed with body of victim in dumpster
Harold UT
* DNA excluded defendants at the time of trial.
Victim's clothing not found inside sheet
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Exoneree State ji 5 Non-Public Facts, Cormborated Facts,
and Inconsistencies
* Description ofheight weight build ofvictim
* Description of color of victim's pants and top
* Description of crime scene
* Description ofother attacks in the Padk
* Victim was hit with a pipe covered with black
tape
Richardson, NVideo
Kevin * Among inconsistencies, describes the group
leaving the reservoir before encountering the
jogger, this was likely "some 45 minutes" later.
For a description of the timeline problem, see
Jim Dwyer & Kevin Flynn, New Light on
Jogger's Rape Calls Evidence into Question,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 2002.
* Victim was babysitting two children, a boy and a
girl
* Washed hands in the sink after murder
*Victim's apartment had two floors, was messy
with clothes strewn everywhere, and a TV was
on
* Victim raped, vaginally and anally
Rivera, Juan IL J * Victim cut more than two times with knife
* Knife broken into two pieces
* Left through back door, breaking it with a mop
BUT
* DNA excluded at third trial
* Inconsistencies included what victim was
wearing, directions to the house, not mentioning
breaking the back door
* Identified victim frm series ofphotographs and
signed photo
* Stated date of crime and address for crime at
senior citizens home
* Described method of attack, as victim entered
Rollns,Lafonso IL J,ID apartment, pulled a knife, told victim not to yell, Signed
and was given $60
* Described ordering victim to take off clothes,
masturbating on victim, and wiping self with
pillow case before leaving. Serologist identified
semen on victim's pillow case
* Location of victim's house Signed
Ruffin, Lany MS * Layout of the house statement
* Described attack on a female jogger in Central
Padk
* Described rape
Salaam, Yusef NY J * Victim was hit with a pipe
* The pipe was about sixteen inches long, with tape
on it
*Victim's clothes were partially removed
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Exoneree State xm/W85 Non-Public Facts, Conwborated Facts, Domented?
and Inconistencies
* A white female, wearing jogging clothes, was
attacked in the Park
* Described involvement in attack on victim
* Victim was hit with a brick
* Descibed a series of other attacks, including the
radio headset worn by male jogger
* Told detectives during crime scene visit that
Santana, victim was first struck on madway and then Video
Raymond dragged into the woods
UT
* Among inconsistencies, describes the group
leaving
* For a description of the timeline problem, see Jim
Dwyer & Kevin Flynn, New Light on Jogger's
Rape Calls Evidence into Question, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 1, 2002.
*Description of victim's clothing
* Victim's injuries
SPresence of a shovel
Saunders, *Location of the murder Signed
IL J BUT
Michael * DNA did not match the defendants
* Did not mention that shovel was used to hit
victim. Initially described victim's jacket as red,
then yellow, it was red with yellow lettering
* Group drove victim to field near expressway
*Dmwstring placed in victim's mouth, victim hit
* Victim raped in bushes by expressway, struck
with gun, shot with small automatic gun in the
mouth Signed
Sharp, Shainne L J * Victim waring baseball team shit, blue and statement
white, blue jeans
BUT
* DNA did not match defendants. Gym shoes and
other objects not observed at crime scene
* Described general layout of victim's apartment
* Described involvement of others in a rape
* Described that victim had been found with head
wrapped tightly in a scarf wearing a blue
Shelden, Debra Nnightgown, with towels wrapped around wrists, Vido
and with wrists broken
BUT
* Also denied having any independent knowledge
ofthe victim's residence and did not describe
victim's hands having been bound
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 101:395
ase SaeNon-Public Facts, Coroborated FacDs,Exonere State /ID/M~iand Inconsistencies uetd
* Location ofmurder on walking tail
* Victim was wearing "a purple top or two-toned
and dark pants."
* Victim was hit and kicked, and had pants taken
off
Sterlg Fnk NY * Victim shot with a BB gun, thrown on tmil Video
BUT
* Signs victim was dragged into bmush, not that she
fell into the brush as described
* No BB Gun found
* Victim was wearing a purple jacket with white
stnipes
* Location ofmop and shovel and description of
each
* Shovel was three or four feet long, with a green
metal spade and a bmwn wood handle
* Victim's shirt and pants were ripped
* Victim's body wrapped in a white sheet and left
in an alley
Swift, Terrill I J * Victim's injuries, and specifically that she was Signed
strangled, with foam coming out ofher mouth,
after being hit in the head/face, consistent with
the medical examiner's testimony
BUT
* DNA did not match defendants. Neither mop nor
shovel were described as being broken, but both
objects found near scene in pieces
* Described general layout of victim's apartment
* Described involvement of others in a rape
* Described a pink towel used to bind the victim
* Described Sheldon being pushed into the wall
BUT
* Had described attack occurring in a "light colored
Taylor, Joanne NE house" not an apartmentVie
TlShe also described that law enforcement helped Video
her to remember much of what she testified to
* Taylor had been diagnosed with a "personality
disorder" by a police psychologist and described
having problems with her memory and a belief
she had telepathic abilities, but was not evaluated
by a defense expert
* Gmup drove victim to field near expressway.
* Victim punched in mouth and something put in
victim's mouth Signed
Taylor, Robert IL J * Victim raped sign
* Victim shot in face statement
* Victim was wearing baseball team shirt and blue
and white jeans. Shirt ripped offvictim
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Exoneree State J/ ID M... Non-Public Facts, Corroborated Facts, Documnted?Exoere tae / D MIand hionisenie
* Victim choked fiom behind
* Victim hit in the head with a shovel with a
wooden handle Signed
Thames, Vincent 1 * Victim wrapped in a white sheet with colored statement
flowers on it
* Crime scene was cleaned with a mop
* Victim choked and strangled with a wire
* Victim assaulted on levee on side closest to river,
position of victim's body
* Victim had sex with him while lying on back and
with shorts removed BUT
* Although he stated he ejaculated, no semen was
recovered from victim's clothing or at autopsy,
nor on ground at crime scene
Thibodeaux, * Physical evidence suggested no rape occured
LA * Physical evidence also suggested victim had been Video
Damon dragged, and also kicked from behind
* Having been told victim was strangled, stated he
used a white or gray speaker wire from his car,
but victim was strangled with red electrical cord
bumed off section of cord found hanging on a
tree above victim's body
* Victim not assaulted with bare hands, but rather
with a blunt object
* Victim not choked with hands, but rather a wire
* Townsend led police to six different crime
scenes, confessed at each, and correctly
identified location of the body at one crime scene
* He knew one victim was strangled
* He described that one victim was wearing a dress
* He described that a white house at the crime
Townsend, Jerry U scene had previously been yellow Auo
BUT
* Townsend gave incorrect information, including
the wrong name for a victim, claimed to have cut
a victim who suffered no cuts. See Amy Driscoll
& Manny Garcia, Townsend Confession at
Odds with Evidence, Miami Hemld, May 27,
2001.
* Venetian blind cords used to hang victim (see
next column)
BUT
Vasquez, David VA ID * Leading apparent fiom the recording and State Audio
acknowledges that "at times his statements were
virtually incomprehensible"
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Non-Pubic Facts, Coroborted Facts, Documented?Exoneree~an StatcJ/D/MteDoumeted
* Victim taken to vacant field, description of field
* Victim punched in face
* Victim punched in mouth, dark scarftied amund SignedVeal, Robert Lee IL J miouth igaemnt
* Coat, jeans, and ring removed
* Victim shot with dark colored handgun in the
mouth, scarf removed prior to shooting
* Victim was wearing a nightshirt
* Victim was cooking chicken
* Victim was missing money fm his wallet
* The murder weapon was a knife that was kept in
the kitchen, about 12 inches with serrated blade
* The victim was stabbed multiple times
* The victim owned a pink ring and gold cross
* The timefiame of the killing Signed
Wamey, Douglas NY MI * There was tissue used as a bandage covered with statementblood
* There was a pomographic tape in the victim's
television
BUT
* Inconsistencies included that there was no
evidence ofthe stabbing or struggle in the
kitchen
* Defendant had a history of mental illness
* Victim was a woman who was raped and stabbed
* He left his shirt at crime scene
* He left it in a back bedmom in a dresser drawer
* He took off the victim's halter top
* He cut himself and bled
* The radio was on
* Location of attack in Culpeper
BUT
* The statement also included numerous Signed
inconsistencies, including the race ofthe victim, statement
describing her as short when she was tall,
describing just a few stabbings when there
several dozen, among others
* He could not locate the victim's apartment until
being bmught directly to it
*He had confessed to a series ofother crimes when
asked to do so, but the witnesses to those crimes
and other evidence cleared him
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Exoneree State J/ll) Miss Non-Public Facts, Cormborated Facts, Documented?Exonene State J ID /MIand Incomsistencies uetd
* Date and time of assault
* Location on grassy hill in park, near ballfield
* Victim was walking with fiend a long ways in
front of her, and was forced down in between
Watkins, John bushes
AZ J * Victim had shorts lowered, not removed Video
Kenneth completely off legs
* Culprit had buttocks fully exposed and pants
partially lowered, penis made contact with
victim
* A witness intenupted the attack
* None. He finally reportedly admitted, "I guess I
did it I guess I did it. I did everything." And:
"What you want me to sayl I must have done
Williams, Johnny CA it." And "I don't remember. I can't say I do. I (ini
don't remember. I was high. If Idid, I was high.(iitenrty
I don't know. I mean, you got me on the tape
and evrtIg.
* Female victim was killed by a cord wrapped
around neck to strangled her and stabbed
BUT
Williamson, * Medical examiner concluded that wounds were
Ronald OK MI not caused by a knife
* Williamson was mentally ill and actively
psychotic at the time of the trial, if not also
during the time ofpolice interogations
* Stabbed sleeping victim on couch
* Used steak knife with "a brown handle and ridges
on the edge"
* Stabbed second victim in bedoom
* Moved one victim to couch in living room,
corrected district attomey on which mom one
victim was in
* One victim punched in the face, consistent with
Wilson, Sharif * o radio, telephone and fan used to tie
victims
BUT
* Steak knives found at the scene had no traces of
blood and were very dull According to autopsy,
victims died from strangulation and not from
stabbing
* Statements concerning victims filling back asleep
during the assault
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Exoneree State JIDAH"'~fl 5  Non-Public Facts, Corroborated Facts, Documented?
and Inconsistencies
* Described how one would reach the victim's
apartment
* Described general layout of victim's apartment
Winslow, Thonx NE * Described involvement of others in a rape Video
BUT
* Also denied having any independent knowledge
of the victim's residence
* The jogger's clothing colors
* Details about attacks on others in the Park
* Description of crime scene, including during visit
to scene
* Victim was gagged
* Male victim was hit with a "bar'
Wise, Kharey NY J BUT Video
* Statements in the video were inconsistent with the
crime scene evidence, such as the description of
how "before they left, he pulled out his knife and
cut her up. They cut her legs. They pull out and
start cutting her legs up, her chest, whatever, I
didn't really see it"
* Stabbed victim three times in stomach with
kitchen knife
* Tied second victim with "radio cord."
Yarbough, * Stabbed second victim sleeping on couch
NY J BUT Video
Anthony * The steak knives found at scene had no traces of
blood and were very dull
* According to the autopsy, victims died from
strangulation and not from stabbing
* That the victim had been raped
* A brown landau roof on the victim's car
Yas, Nicholas PA * ofthose specific facts were reportedly made
during an unrecorded and undocumented
portion of the interrogation
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